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ARTICLES 
THE PUBLIC HOUSING TENANCY: 
VARIATIONS ON THE COMMON LAW 
THAT GIVE SECURITY OF TENURE 
ANDCONTROL 
Shelby D. Green* 
"A Decent Place to Livev** 
The purpose of the United States Housing Act1 is "to promote the gen- 
eral welfare of the Nation by employing its funds and credit . . . to remedy 
the unsafe and unsanitary housing conditions and the acute shortage of 
decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for families of lower i n~ome . "~  After 
nearly sixty years, and despite the employment of a wide variety of hous- 
ing assistance programs providing both in-kind and monetary benefits: 
the success of the Housing Act in achieving its stated aim is continually 
debated. The persistent shortage of adequate housing: the dilapidation 
* Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law, White Plains, N.Y. 
J.D., Georgetown University Law Center; B.S., Towson State College. 
** 42 U.S.C. 5 1437f(a) (1988). 
1. United States Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896,50 Stat. 888 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. $8 1437 to 1437j (1988)) [hereinafter Housing Act]. 
2. 42 U.S.C. 5 1437 (1988). 
3. Federal housing assistance programs offer in-kind benefits in the form of public 
housing, subsidized housing, and Section 8 Existing Housing. See 42 U.S.C. 9 1437f. For 
convenience, this article refers to recipients of all three types of benefits as public housing 
tenants. Housing programs also include demand-side subsidies, including vouchers, cash 
supplements, and cash allowances for recipients to rent housing in the private market, as 
well as tax benefits and mortgage insurance to enable recipients to purchase housing. See 
infra notes 63-91 and accompanying text. 
4. See, e.g., Peter W. Salsich, Jr., A Decent Home for Every American: Can the 1949 
Goal Be Met?, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1619 (1993) (discussing the dichotomy in housing for 
Americans of different economic means); Michael A. Wolf, HUD and Housing in the 
1990s: Crises in Affordability and Accountability, 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 545 (1991) (dis- 
cussing the widening gap between housing costs and household income and the effective- 
ness of Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) programs in addressing 
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of public housing projects: the plague of drug and other criminal activity 
in many public housing projects, and the high cost of administering public 
housing programs reveal the Act's failure in accomplishing its goaL6 
- - -- - - - - -- - -- - - - -- 
this problem). The increase in housing shortages has paralleled the rise in the national rate 
of poverty. Salsich, supra, at 1630-31. A higher rate of poverty or a general decline in the 
economy produces a decrease in housing starts in the private sector. Over the past two 
decades, slower real income growth and higher real housing costs have exacerbated the 
problem of housing shortages for low- and moderate-income households. JOINT CENTER 
FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING 2, 15 
(1991) [hereinafter STATE OF HOUSING]. Low-income families disproportionately suffer 
from the effects of a housing shortage because they are unable to outbid more affluent 
parties for this scarce resource. 
In addition to a decline in the rate of new housing starts, from the mid-1970s to the mid- 
1980s, more than 4.5 million housing units were demolished or structurally converted, per- 
manently removing them from the nation's housing stock. NATIONAL HOUS. TASK FORCE, 
A DECENT PLACE TO LIVE 6 (1988) [hereinafter HOUSING TASK FORCE]. 
The same economic factors have stifled the growth of new publicly-owned housing. Be- 
tween 1965 and 1985, starts of publicly owned housing dramatically decreased-from 
36,900 to 3100 units, a decline of 91.6%. See Fenna Pit & Willem van Vliet, Public Housing 
in the United States, in HANDBOOK OF HOUSING AND THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT IN THE 
UNITED STATES 199,201 (Elizabeth Huttman & Willem van Vliet eds., 1988) [hereinafter 
HANDBOOK OF HOUSING]. See generally Lawrence B. Simons, Toward a New National 
Housing Policy, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 259 (1988) (suggesting that a new housing policy 
is needed to address changing housing demands). 
5. As early as 1957, housing experts and commentators found little to praise in public 
housing. They criticized the rigidity and paternalism in management, crudity and segrega- 
tion in project design, and a deplorable fragmentation of general housing policy. Catherine 
Bauer, The Dreary Deadlock of Public Housing, ARCHITEC~URAL F., May 1957, at 140, 
140 (arguing that the public housing initiatives of the New Deal failed to achieve their 
goals); see Pit & van Vliet, supra note 4, at 212. Commentators cited public housing's 
interior-space deficiencies, unimaginative exterior designs, and poor location planning. 
These deficiencies "were exacerbated in the late 1950s and 1960s when economizing meas- 
ures contributed to increasingly 'functional' designs that failed to take account of the soci- 
obehavioral needs of the tenant." Id. Furthermore, commentators contended that public 
housing design failures resulted from social prejudice and the use of military standardiza- 
tion techniques. At that time, governments believed that public housing should be 
designed with minimum space and no frills because such amenities should be provided only 
to those who could climb the social ladder on their own. Id. at 214. 
6. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON PRIVATIZATION, PRIVATIZATION: TOWARD MORE 
EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT 11 (1988) [hereinafter PRIVATIZATION COMMISSION]. The Com- 
mission reported that, in 1988, the cost of constructing new public housing was approxi- 
mately two and one-half times greater than the cost of housing provided through existing 
rental markets and that the cost of new subsidized housing was approximately twice the 
existing market rate. Id. On a monthly basis, new construction of public housing cost 
almost $700 per unit; whereas housing obtained with vouchers cost about $300 per month. 
Id. The report explained that the differential is partly a function of higher operating costs. 
Id.; see UNITED STATES DEP'T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. AND 
RESEARCH, ALTERNATIVE OPERATING SUBSIDY SYSTEMS FOR THE PUBLIC HOUSING PRO- 
GRAM V, 306-26 (1982) (discussing the principles and cost of the voucher system) [herein- 
after PROGRAM V]. 
In the debate over the cost of housing programs, in-kind assistance, whereby public 
housing is provided, is compared with direct income supplements and direct payments to 
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Some commentators have proposed privatization as a means of correcting 
these failures.' 
In general, "privatization" refers to a shift of governmental functions 
from the public to the private sector.* Privatization is based on the belief 
that the transfer of control over the distribution of government benefits 
from a public employee to a private entrepreneur will lead to significant 
improvements in perf~rmance.~ Proponents of privatization assert that 
such improvements will result because the private sector can provide 
goods and services more efficiently than the government.1° In simple 
economic terms, privatization is grounded in the theory that the most effi- 
cient result is attained if the process is guided solely by economic self- 
interest, rather than political or social policy." The privatization move- 
ment achieved perhaps its greatest momentum during the previous two 
lessors of existing housing. Rachel G. Bratt, Public Housing: The Controversy and Contri- 
bution, in CRITICAL PERSPE~IVES ON HOUSING 335, 350 (Rachel G. Bratt et al. eds., 
1986). Additionally, in-kind assistance is compared with other subsidized new construction 
programs. Id. One commentator argued that only the second comparison is legitimate. 
Id. Studies show that, at worst, the cost of operating existing public housing developments 
is approximately equal to the cost of direct payments to lessors of existing housing. Id. 
The debate can be characterized as follows: 
First,. . . the comparison [between in-kind assistance and direct payments] is not a 
fair one because, in the case of public housing, new units are built, and in the 
housing allowance programs they are not, it is less costly to subsidize a household 
through [direct payments to lessors in existing housing] than to subsidize the con- 
struction of a new unit of public housing. Second, the cost of subsidizing house- 
holds in existing public housing units is no higher than the cost of subsidizing 
households in existing private units . . . . Third, no conclusions can be drawn about 
the cost of building new public housing in comparison to other subsidized new 
construction programs. 
Id. at 353-54. 
7. See Ronald A. Cass, Privatization: Politics, Law, and Theory, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 
449 (1988) (discussing rationales supporting and opposing privatization); Robert C. Ellick- 
son, The Legal Dimension of the Privatization Movement, GEO. MASON U .  L. REV., Winter 
1988, at 157 (discussing the relationship between the Constitution and privatization); 
Michael H. Schill, Privatizing Federal Low Income Housing Assistance: The Case of Public 
Housing, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 878 (1990) (reviewing the privatization theory and arguing 
that federal housing assistance for low-income families should consist of housing al- 
lowances and vouchers, relying to a greater extent on the private sector for the delivery of 
services). 
8. Schill, supra note 7, at 881. 
9. See id. at 882. 
10. See id. at 882-87,900. The proposition may reflect nothing more than the popular 
belief in the superiority of private enterprise over the presumed intrinsic evil of public 
ownership. EUGENE J. MEEHAN, THE QUALITY OF FEDERAL POLICYMAKING: PROGRAM- 
MED FAILURE IN PUBLIC HOUSING 136 (1979) (commenting on the privatization concept). 
11. See generally Richard P. Appelbaum & John I. Gilderbloom, Supply-Side Eco- 
nomics and Rents: Are Rental Housing Markets Truly Competitive?, in CRITICAL PERSPEC- 
T I V E ~  ON HOUSING, supra note 6, at 165 (discussing the inapplicability of traditional 
supply-side economics to the urban housing market). 
Heinonline - -  43 Catholic U. L. Rev. 683 1993-1994 
684 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 43:681 
presidential administrations.12 
In the public housing context, privatization calls for the government to 
withdraw from the business of providing in-kind housing assistance.13 
Two methods of privatizing public housing have been proposed. The first 
requires selling off or demolishing the federal stock of public housing fa- 
cilities, terminating all monetary subsidies to housing projects, and substi- 
tuting a program in which low-income families would receive vouchers or 
cash allowances to obtain housing in the private market.14 The second 
method works in a more sinister fashion, through drastic, but invited, 
budget red~ctions. '~ 
12. In 1988, the President's Commission on Privatization recommended the privatiza- 
tion of a broad array of existing governmental services, including education, prison admin- 
istration, and low-income housing construction. PRIVATIZATION COMMISSION, supra note 
6; Schill, supra note 7, at 878. With respect to low-income housing, the Commission recom- 
mended the sale of public housing units to tenants at discounted prices. PRIVATIZATION 
COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 17-18; Schill, supra note 7, at 878. In the same year, Con- 
gress passed legislation to facilitate these sales. See Schill, supra note 7, at 878, 879. 
13. See PRIVATIZATION COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 16-18 (suggesting that the gov- 
ernment should sell some of the public housing stock to tenants). In 1982, the President's 
Commission, reflecting the privatization movement, did not support construction of new 
housing as a method for providing government housing assistance. Id. at 13. 
14. Id. at 14-18. In 1982, then Secretary of HUD, Samuel Pierce, submitted a report 
to Congress proposing alternative housing subsidy systems that would base payments to 
agencies administering in-kind housing programs (public housing agencies (PHAs)) on a 
private rent index, which would represent the costs of supplying private market rental 
housing to families currently living in public housing. Public housing tenants would receive 
a direct federal subsidy in the form of a voucher, either to remain in public housing or to 
move to a private market unit that met the voucher program's housing quality standards. 
PROGRAM V, supra note 6, at xxiii. PHAs could charge rents by the same method as a 
private landlord. Id. This last alternative envisioned that some existing housing projects 
would disappear entirely. Id. at 306-08. 
15. In the 1980s, the secretary of HUD forced a reluctant Congress to cut HUD's 
housing budget by two-thirds, from $23.8 billion to $6.1 billion. Ira S. Lowry, Housing 
Policy for the 1990s: A Planner's Guide, J .  AM. PLAN. ASS'N, Winter 1989, at 93, 94; see 
Michael A. Stegman & J. David Holden, NONFEDERAL HOUSING PROGRAMS 9 (1987) (ex- 
plaining the federal government's decreasing role towards housing assistance in the 1980s); 
Mary K. Nenno, Reagan's '88 Budget: Dismantling HUD, 44 J .  Hous. 103 (1987) (analyz- 
ing the Reagan administration's funding of HUD programs). See generally M.H. Hoeflich 
& John E. 'Ihies, Rethinking American Housing Policy: Defederalizing Subsidized Housing, 
1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 629 (commenting on the benefits of privatization and federal govern- 
ment involvement in housing). 
In its 1986 budget proposal, the Reagan administration called for a cut of $600 million in 
operating subsidies to public housing agencies, a decrease from $1.7 billion to $175 million 
for the modernization of existing housing facilities (to meet emergency needs only) and a 
one-year freeze on "fair market rents" under the Section 8 programs. Chester Hartman, 
Housing Policies Under the Reagan Administration, in CRITICAL P E R S P E ~ I V E S  ON HOUS- 
ING, supra note 6, at 362,365-66, 373. 
The most recent privatization effort is the proposed Housing Voucher Act of 1993, H.R. 
1124, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The bill proposes to withdraw federal assistance for 
new construction of public housing. Id. 88 2-4. Federal funds would instead be appropri- 
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The idea that the availability and quality of housing will be determined 
solely by the ability of persons seeking housing to pay rent at market 
rates provides the rationale for the method of cash  allowance^.'^ To a 
great extent, however, this notion is false. In reality, decisions by prop- 
erty owners to enter into or to refuse to enter into landlord-tenant rela- 
tionships are also based upon factors that do not reflect economic 
rationality. "Nonmonetary" factors such as racism, low-income status, 
family composition, and receipt of public benefits operate to exclude low- 
income families from available housing in the private sector to at least the 
same degree as monetary limitations.'' In the past, even public housing 
agencies receiving federal assistance excluded families on the basis of 
some of these factors.18 Moreover, private lease law, to the extent that it 
does not afford the private sector tenant any form of tenancy security 
beyond the lease term and gives little control over the other terms of the 
landlord-tenant relationship, can deny low-income families a decent place 
to live, even when they are able to pay market-rate rent. The cash allow- 
ance method, therefore, considers only one aspect of the housing ques- 
tion-the economic predicate of acquisition-while ignoring the 
sociological impediments and jurisprudential constraints associated with 
obtaining adequate housing. 
The legal rules governing the "public housing tenancy," while rooted in 
the common law, have evolved to mitigate the harsh effects of the eco- 
nomic and noneconomic factors that determine the availability and qual- 
ated to provide cash allowances to low-income families to rent dwelling units owned and 
operated by private landlords. Id. 8 5. 
16. The problem of affordability has been identified as the most critical housing prob- 
lem of the 1990s. Since affordability and housing supply are interdependent issues, af- 
fordability restricts the production of new housing. The price of housing is set by supply 
and demand. See Appelbaum & Gilderbloom, supra note 11, at 165,167. In a tight hous- 
ing market, homelessness is at its highest level because of the degree of competition for 
available private units. Id. In order for low-income families to manage in this type of 
market under cash allowance programs, they must have sufficient resources to outbid 
others. Id. 
17. See James A. Kushner, The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988: The Second 
Generation of Fair Housing, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1049,1050-51 (1989) (examining the con- 
nection between housing and civil rights issues). 
18. A provision in the Housing Act of 1949 manifests the early congressional response 
to this kind of discrimination. It provided that public housing agencies receiving public 
funds could not discriminate against families whose incomes derived in whole or in part 
from public assistance. Housing Act of 1949, ch. 338, 8 301(8)(c), 63 Stat. 413,423 (super- 
seded in the 1974 general revision of the Housing Act of 1937 by Pub. L. No. 93-383, 
8 20l(a), 88 Stat. 633, 653 (1974)). The Fair Housing Act, the civil rights acts, and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act were subsequently enacted and amended to address hous- 
ing discrimination on the basis of race, religion, gender, and family status. See Gautreaux 
v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907, 914 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (finding that discriminatory 
selection of public housing project sites is prohibited by federal law). 
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ity of public housing. This Article explores the character of the public 
housing tenancy, comparing it with the common law tenancy under pri- 
vate lease law and evaluating the degree to which private lease law will 
protect the interests of low-income families if current proposals to abolish 
existing in-kind housing programs are adopted. Part I1 of this Article 
traces the history of federally funded housing programs and describes the 
various strategies employed. Part I11 discusses the recent changes in 
modern private lease law and recounts the basic rights and obligations of 
the landlord and tenant, which define and govern the rights of low-in- 
come families under a cash allowance program. Part IV describes the 
evolution of the public housing tenancy and demonstrates how its devel- 
opment has outpaced that of the common law tenancy. Part V explores 
the legal and social policy implications of dismantling the in-kind housing 
programs. Part VI concludes that the public housing tenancy is necessary 
to protect public housing tenants from victimization under private lease 
law. 
The United States Housing Act of 1937, which was a New Deal mea- 
sure passed at the height of the Great Depression, established public 
housing programs.lg During the Depression, private construction of resi- 
dential housing came to a virtual halt.20 Consequently, with no new 
mortgages to issue, banks foreclosed existing mortgages at a rate of more 
than a thousand per day by 1933." Those who lost their homes had to 
move to slum tenements because decent, affordable housing was unavail- 
able.22 In 1937, there was little public control over the quality, type, and 
location of housing, except those standards imposed by the tenement 
codes in the nation's largest cities.23 These codes were enacted, however, 
not to address housing shortages, but rather, to address slum housing con- 
ditions that were thought to threaten the public health and well-being, 
such as diseases (smallpox, dysentery, tuberculosis), fire hazards, and 
19. United States Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896,50 Stat. 888 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. $5 1437 to 1437j (1988)). 
20. The Depression caused the rates of construction of residential property and ex- 
penditures on home repairs to fall by more than 90%. KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS 
FRONTIER: THE SUBURBAN~ZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 187 (1985). 
21. In 1926, banks foreclosed about 68,000 homes; in 1930 this number rose to about 
130,000, increasing to nearly 200,000 in 1931 and to 250,000 in 1932. Id. at 188-89. In the 
spring of 1933, 50% of all home mortgages were technically in default, and foreclosures 
reached the rate of more than one thousand per day. Id. 
22. Bratt, supra note 6, at 337-38. 
23. See Roger A. Cunningham, The New Implied and Statutory Warranties of Habita- 
bility in Residential Leases: From Contract to Status, 16 URB. L. ANN. 3, 10-14 (1979). 
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crime.24 The codes, which were usually only applicable to multiple-family 
dwellings, typically "prescribed minimum standards for fire safety, venti- 
lation, sanitation, and weather-tightness of roofs."" The codes were not 
designed to guarantee a decent home, as originally envisioned by Con- 
gress when it passed the Housing Act.26 
The period preceding the Depression has been described as the classi- 
cal period in the history of American contract and property law-a pe- 
riod which embraced laissez-faire economics and defended vested 
property  interest^.^' In contract law, the prevailing principle obligated 
the courts simply to enforce contracts, unexceptional on other grounds:* 
precisely as the parties had made them." According to utilitarian and 
Kantian notions, contract law would promote justice because it permitted 
parties to contract freely and enforced the result of such freely-made 
agreement.30 While all property interests were protected, the law favored 
entrepreneurial property interests over rentier interests, as well as com- 
mercial and large-scale pursuits over the pursuits of farmers, artisans, and 
the working class.31 In the area of private lease law, this preference 
24. Peter Marcuse, Housing Policy and the Myth of the Benevolent State, in CRITICAL 
PERSPEC~IVES ON HOUSING, supra note 6, at 248,250-51. 
25. Id. at 249; see Cunningham, supra note 23, at 11 (noting code requirements on 
sanitation for " 'good and sufficient water closets or privies' " (quoting 1867 N.Y. LAWS, 
ch. 908, 55 1-19)); Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of American Landlord-Tenant 
Law, 23 B.C. L. REV. 503,518-19 (1982) (citing New York and Massachusetts code provi- 
sions requiring landlords to maintain the premises). In 1867, New York was the first state 
to enact a tenement code. These laws were prototypes for the modern housing code. Cun- 
ningham, supra note 23, at 10-11; Glendon, supra, at 519. Housing codes did not, however, 
become common until the mid-1950s. Cunningham, supra note 23, at 13. 
26. Nathan Straus, End the Slums, in NEW DEAL THOUGHT 158.160-61 (Howard Zinn 
ed., 1966). 
27. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 396-97 (1973); JAMES 
W. HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM 10-11 (1956); Glendon, supra note 
25, at 509; Michael E. Parrish, The Great Depression, the New Deal, and the American 
Legal Order, 59 WASH. L. REV. 723,724 (1984). 
28. Exceptions recognized by the courts included instances in which a party alleged 
illegality, fraud, mistake, or demanded public policy. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CON- 
T R A ~  LAW IN AMERICA 15-16 (1965). 
29. Id. at 98. Friedman argues that contract law changed through the application and 
expansion of the concepts of fraud and mistake as a means of mitigating the harshness of 
the classical law. Id. at 99. 
30. HURST, supra note 27, at 10-11. 
31. See Parrish, supra note 27, at 724; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 27, at 157-247 
(discussing the impact of law on the economy between 1776 and 1847); MORTON J. HOR- 
WITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION F AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 212 (1977); Harry N. 
Scheiber, Property Law, Expropriation, and Resource Allocation by Government: The 
United States, 1789-1910, 33 J. ECON. HIST. 232, 233-34 (1973). Parrish notes that recent 
historical works have reconceptualized the legal order during this period and have demon- 
strated that the law held preferences for those rules and property interests that favored 
economic growth. Parrish, supra note 27, at 724. 
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meant that a landlord had no duty to the tenant except to deliver the 
premises.32 
On a national scale, the Depression produced a stagnant economy and 
astounding levels of unemployment-in 1937, one-quarter of the work 
force was unemployed.33 As a result, a new group of poor emerged, com- 
prised of former members of the middle class, mostly white, who had 
enjoyed the prosperity of the twenties.34 Poverty became visible, remark- 
able, and, in the view of many, ~ n d e s e r v e d . ~ ~  
Few pretend that the original Housing Act was solely an act of char- 
Professor Friedman writes that it is a mistake to suppose that the 
32. During the classical period of American contract and property law, the landlord's 
principal obligation was to give the tenant the exclusive possession of the premises. John 
A. Humbach, The Common- Law Conception of Leasing: Mitigation, Habitability, and De- 
pendence of Covenants, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 1213,1261-62 (1983). This required conveyance 
of a nonfreehold possessory "estate" under the common law. Aside from his reversion, the 
landlord had no rights in and no obligation regarding the property's physical condition or 
its state of repair during the term of the lease. Id. at 1263-64. A tenant's remedies against 
a landlord were limited to cases where there had been an actual or constructive eviction. 
The tenant's principal obligation was to pay rent. This obligation was premised on the 
notion developed under early English common law that rent issued from the land. See id. 
at 1225-28. Therefore, so long as the tenant retained possession of the land, even if the 
buildings thereon were destroyed, the duty to pay rent continued. Id. at 1232. Under early 
common law, a landlord could expressly covenant to maintain the leased premises. Id. at 
1263-64. In addition to an implied warranty that there were no latent defects in the prem- 
ises, a landlord was held to an implied warranty of fitness for furnished dwellings. See id. 
at 1267-68. 
33. Approximately fourteen million Americans were unemployed by early 1933. Law- 
rence M. Friedman, Public Housing and the Poor: An Overview, 54 CAL. L. REV. 642, 645 
(1966) [hereinafter Public Housing]. 
34. Id. at 645-47, 649, 651-52; Pit & van Vliet, supra note 4, at 201. The 1920s wit- 
nessed a decade-long bull market where "middle-class Americans were told that they could 
reap high profits by blindly investing in just about any collection of common stocks." J. 
Bradford De Long, What Morgan Wrought, WILSON Q., Autumn 1992, at 17, 26-27; see 
EDGAR L. SMITH, COMMON STOCKS AS LONG TERM INVESTMENTS 76-80 (1934) (explain- 
ing the stock market's increase in value from the mid-1800s to the 1920s). The subsequent 
crash of the market was an important factor in the general depression of the middle class. 
35. Public Housing, supra note 33, at 645-46. This growing population of former mid- 
dle-class persons among the poor prompted immediate legislation. Friedman explains that 
these former middle-class persons 
retained their middle-class culture and their outlook, their articulateness, their 
habit of expressing their desires at the polls. There were, therefore, millions of 
candidates for public housing who did not belong (as later was true) to the class 
of the "problem poor"; rather they were members of what we might call the sub- 
merged middle class. . . . Public housing was not supported by the dregs of society; 
a discontented army of men and women of high demands and high expectations 
stood ready to insist on decent housing from government or at least stood ready 
to approve and defend it. 
Id. 
36. Id. at 646 (explaining that lawmakers perceived public housing to be a stimulus to 
jobs and business); Marcuse, supra note 24, at 249-52 (noting that public housing was used 
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Housing Act "arose solely out 0f.a gradual persuasion of decent-minded 
people that the slums were odious, crowded, and evil, and that the federal 
government had a duty to relieve the sufferings of the poor," since re- 
formers long before the Depression had worked to achieve public hous- 
ing without sufficient  result^.^' Other historians note that public housing 
programs arose from concerns about social unrest among unemployed 
city workers and that the New Deal housing programs were intended to 
address those concerns.38 These programs featured provisions for better 
housing and, more significantly, additional jobs.39 
During the Depression, the public housing provision was not thought 
to have a public purpose, at least as it would justify the condemnation of 
private property by the g ~ v e r n m e n t . ~ ~  United States v. Certain Lands in 
the City of Loui~ville,4~ a federal appeals court decision, reflected this 
view. The court found that the Progress Works Administration (PWA) 
had the power of eminent domain for public purposes, but the construc- 
tion of public housing did not constitute such a purpose.42 This ruling 
seemed to foreclose most federal government programs providing for the 
direct construction of public housing.43 The exercise of the eminent do- 
main power by local governments for public housing purposes, however, 
had already been tested and upheld in state courts.44 Congress, there- 
as a means to facilitate economic productivity and social control); Pit & van Vliet, supra 
note 4, at 205 (noting that public housing programs were intended to stimulate depressed 
industry, create jobs, and provide affordable housing to the poor). 
37. Public Housing, supra note 33, at 645. Another historian comments that: 
The New Dealers themselves were articulate, humane, and on occasion 
profound. . . . They had no clearly defined set of goals, beyond that of extricating 
the nation from the depression of 1929-32. In the course of easing the crisis, 
however, they found themselves-pushed partly by the cries of alarm on all sides, 
partly by inner humanitarian impulses-creating new laws and institutions like 
the Tennessee Valley Authority, the social security system, farm subsidies, mini- 
mum wage standards, the National Labor Relations Board, and public housing. 
HOWARD ZINN, THE POLITICS OF HISTORY 118 (1970); see WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, 
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL 1932-1940, at 134-35 (1963) (commenting 
on the social, economic, and political repercussions of the New Deal); Jerold S. Auerbach, 
New Deal, Old Deal, or Raw Deal: Some Thoughts on New Lefi Historiography, J. S .  HIST., 
Feb. 1969, at 18 (same). 
38. Marcuse, supra note 24, at 254. 
39. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 37, at 134. 
40. Under the National Industrial Recovery Act, which provided for the creation of 
the Public Works Administration (PWA), the federal government sought to condemn pri- 
vate property in order to construct public housing. Jane L. McGrew & Ana Fabregas, The 
Housing Act of 1937: Legal Origins, 44 J. Hous. 156, 156 (1987). 
41. 78 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 297 U.S. 726 (1936). 
42. Id. at 686. 
43. Because of powerful opposition by various interest groups, an appeal of the deci- 
sion was withdrawn. See McGrew & Fabregas, supra note 40, at 157. 
44. See, e.g., New York City Hous. Auth. v. Muller, 1 N.E.2d 153 (N.Y. 1936); see also 
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fore, was able to enact the Housing Act, which vested the United States 
Housing Authority with the power to make grants and loans to local 
housing agencies for the acquisition, development, and administration of 
housing for low-income families4' 
President Roosevelt attempted to address the economic effects of the 
Depression by devising social welfare and relief programs that would ad- 
dress the basic human needs of the benefit recipients, while creating new 
jobs and stimulating business without placing the government in competi- 
tion with the private sector.46 In the context of public housing, this strat- 
egy meant that the government would only provide housing to those who 
could not possibly afford to obtain it on their own. Tenants, however, 
were not given public housing for free. They were given only a subsidy to 
cover the unpaid required market-rate rent, ensuring that housing 
projects would be occupied by "poor but honest  worker^."^' Public hous- 
ing, therefore, was provided in a manner that minimized competition with 
housing available in the private sector.48 To avoid a housing oversupply, 
Myres S. McDougal and Addison A. Mueller, Public Purpose in Public Housing: An 
Anachronism Reburied, 52 YALE L.J. 42,45-47 (1943) (explaining that other courts deter- 
mined state expenditures on "activities such as gasoline filling stations, tourists' camps, 
public golf courses, ice plants, municipal celebrations, city bands, and opera houses" to be 
within the "public purpose"). 
45. Congress enacted the Housing Act of 1949, which created the Urban Renewal 
Program and provided direct subsidies to local governmental agencies to clear decaying 
areas and provide sites for moderately priced housing. Housing Act of 1949, ch. 338, 63 
Stat. 413 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 9 1441 (1988)). As part of the Act, Congress 
authorized the construction of an additional 800,000 public housing units and established 
the national housing policy of "a decent home and a suitable living environment for every 
American family." Id. The Housing Act of 1954 broadened urban renewal plans to in- 
clude conservation and rehabilitation requirements. Housing Act of 1954, ch. 649, § 302, 
68 Stat. 622 (superseded in the 1974 general revision of the Housing Act of 1937 by Pub. L. 
No. 93-383, 5 116, 88 Stat. 633, 652 (1974)). 
46. See Straus, supra note 26, at 163 (noting that public housing programs did not 
contemplate competition with private industry); see also LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 37, at 
134-35 (commenting that the purpose of the housing program was to stimulate jobs and 
business); Pit & van Vliet, supra note 4, at 205 (same). 
47. See Public Housing, supra note 33, at 648; see also Bratt, supra note 6, at 338-39. 
During the debate, Senator Wagner stated. "[tlhere are some people whom we cannot 
possibly reach; I mean those who have no means to pay the rent minus the subsidy." 81 
CONG. REC. 8099 (1937). 
48. The 1937 Act provided housing subsidies to low-income families who could not 
"afford to pay enough to cause private enterprise in their locality . . . to build an adequate 
supply of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for their use." Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896, 
2(2), 50 Stat. 888 (superseded in the 1974 general revision of the Housing Act of 1937 by 
Pub. L. No. 93-383,88 Stat. 633 (1974)). A low-income family was one "whose net income 
at the time of admission [did] not exceed five times the rental" cost. Id. § 2(1) (footnote 
omitted). For families with three or more minor dependents, the ratio was six to one. Id. 
The 1949 Act provided that no annual contributions contract could be entered into un- 
less the local public housing agency demonstrated "that a gap of at least 20 per centum has 
Heinonline - -  43 Catholic U. L. Rev. 690 1993-1994 
19941 Public Housing Tenancy 691 
no public housing units could be built without destroying an equal 
number of existing private sector units, incidentally achieving the end of 
slum ~learance.~' 
Eventually, the New Deal economic recovery measures revived the 
economy and the submerged middle class. By the early 1950s, the middle 
class resumed its original place in the economic hierarchy.s0 As the mid- 
dle class emerged from public housing:' World War I1 shifted national 
priorities away from public housing construction.52 The end of the war 
produced a different class of persons asserting a claim to public housing 
subsidies- veteran^.'^ Indeed, the legal and moral claims of veterans 
forced the adoption of an aggressive strategy to remove the revived mid- 
dle class from public housing, where it had grown comfortable and 
wanted to remain.54 
During the 1950s, another group, comprised largely of blacks, immi- 
been left between the upper rental limits for admission to the proposed low-rent housing 
and the lowest rents at which private enterprise unaided by public subsidy is providing. . . 
decent, safe, and sanitary housing." Housing Act of 1949, ch. 338,8 301(7)(b), 63 Stat. 413, 
422 (superseded in the 1974 general revision of the Housing Act of 1937 by Pub. L. No. 93- 
383. 88 Stat. 633 (1974)). 
49. See ch. 896, 5 15, 50 Stat. 888, 895 (superseded by 42 U.S.C. $8 1437c, 1437d. 
1437f); see also LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 37, at 133-34 (discussing the failures of the 
PWA's slum clearance); Bratt, supra note 6, at 337 (describing the "equivalent elimina- 
tion" process). 
50. Friedman cites a typical example and explains that in 1944, with rising incomes and 
the federal housing subsidy, one-quarter of the families in public housing were able to save 
enough money to buy their own homes. Public Housing, supra note 33, at 649. Other 
historians explain that although there were still nine million unemployed, the New Deal 
began to wane in 1938 and 1939 because its urgency was gone. 
What the New Deal did was to refurbish middle-class America, which had 
taken a dizzying fall in the depression, to restore jobs to half the jobless, and to 
give just enough to the lowest classes (a layer of public housing, a minimum of 
social security) to create an aura of good will. 
ZINN, supra note 37, at 119. 
51. For the middle class, moving away from "public housing" did not mean giving up 
federal housing assistance. Instead, middle-class relief took the form of federal mortgage 
insurance and tax benefits. For a further discussion of these types of federal housing assist- 
ance, see infra text accompanying notes 83-91. 
52. Pit & van Vliet, supra note 4, at 206. The authors report that when the war began, 
fewer than 40,000 public housing units had been constructed. Id. Thus, when economic 
efforts were directed at the war, the serious housing shortage continued. Id. 
53. The National Defense Housing Amendment, for example, authorized the Housing 
Administrator to use his powers "to provide housing for distressed families of servicemen 
and for veterans and their families." National Defense Housing Amendment, ch. 192, 
8 501,59 Stat. 260 (1945) (repealed by executive order). In 1946, the Veterans' Emergency 
Housing Act was passed, creating an emergency housing plan to benefit World War I1 
veterans. Veterans Emergency Housing Act, ch. 268, 60 Stat. 207 (1946) (codified as 
amended at 12 U.S.C. $5 1738, 1739,1743 (1988)). 
54. See Public Housing, supra note 33, at 650-51. 
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grants from the South, and female-headed and elderly households, took 
the veterans' place in public housing.55 Unlike prior inhabitants of public 
housing, this group did not generate any sympathy. It could offer no 
causes to champion, nor could it convince the nation that its need was the 
result of some fault other than its own.56 In this latest era, fringe areas of 
cities and suburban communities resisted the introduction of public hous- 
ing. As a result, the new group of public housing claimants was confined 
to the cores of ~ i t i e s .~ '  Unlike land in the undisturbed suburbs, however, 
urban land had to be purchased, cleared, and redeveloped, making urban 
residence more expen~ive. '~ The higher price for public housing made 
cost-cutting measures i n e ~ i t a b l e . ~ ~  Aesthetic interest was no longer an 
essential element of any public housing construction project. Instead of 
low-rise developments on sprawling acres,60 local housing agencies built 
concentrated high-rise  structure^.^' These projects suffered the effects of 
their circumstances, including crime, producing calls for reform of the 
housing projects and of the conduct of the problem poor.62 
55. PROGRAM V, supra note 6, at 2-3; Public Housing, supra note 33, at 651; see also 
DANIEL R. FUSFELD & TIMOTHY BATES, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE URBAN 
GHETTO 45-66 (1984) (describing the urbanization of African-Americans during the World 
War I1 era). 
56. See Public Housing, supra note 33, at 654-55 (discussing the correlation between 
an increase in the number of African-American poor in public housing and the decline in 
quality and popularity of public housing programs). Friedman explains that: 
The [public housing] program could adapt only with difficulty to its new condi- 
tions, because it had been originally designed for a different clientele. To suit the 
programs to the needs of the new tenant would require fresh legislation; and yet 
change would be difficult to enact and to implement precisely because the new 
clientele would be so poor, so powerless, so inarticulate. The political attractive- 
ness of public housing would diminish. Maladaptations to reality in the program 
would disenchant housing reformers; they would declare the program a failure 
and abandon it to search out fresh cures for bad housing and slums. 
Id. at 649. 
57. Id. at 652. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. For example, in 1944, the Middletown Gardens project in Indiana consisted of "a 
'112-unit low-rent housing community built on an 80-acre outlying tract: 15 acres in houses, 
33 in gardens, 7 a recreation grove, 4 a ball field, 21 untouched timber.' " Id. at 649 (quot- 
ing 1 J. OF HOUSING 47 (1944)). 
61. Id. at 652; Marcuse, supra note 24, at 259. Recently, HUD reported that 32% of 
all public housing projects are multifamily garden apartments, 16% are low-rise walkups, 
27% are high-rise buildings, and 25% are single-family detached or townhouse units. PRO- 
GRAM V, supra note 6, at 3. Almost two-thirds of all public housing projects are in urban 
locations, while 23% are suburban and 13% rural. Moreover, about 30% of public housing 
projects are in neighborhoods predominantly populated by minority residents. Id.; see 
Bratt, supra note 6, at 344 (reporting public housing statistics and describing current public 
housing conditions as satisfactory). 
62. In response, public housing agencies adopted strict rules to control the conduct of 
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A. Politics and Forms of Federal Housing Assistance 
Federal housing policy is manifested in four broad categories of hous- 
ing assistance programs: (1) providing funding to local agencies for the 
construction of public housing projects (public housing); (2) providing di- 
rect payments to owners of existing housing who then provide housing to 
low-income families (Section 8 Existing Housing); (3) providing funds to 
private housing builders (subsidized housing); and (4) providing funds di- 
rectly to housing consumers who then use the funds to obtain housing in 
the private sector (demand-side s ~ b s i d i e s ) . ~ ~  From their inception until 
the early 1960s, federal housing efforts focused on the first category, pub- 
lic housing. From the early 1960s until the 1970s, efforts focused on the 
second and third categories, Section 8 and subsidized housing. In the 
1980s, business groups and their political supporters advocated programs 
in the fourth group, demand-side subsidies.64 
By focusing on public housing, New Deal politicians thought that the 
direct provision of in-kind housing would best achieve the dual aims of 
Roosevelt's strategy, that is, providing relief to those in need, while 
avoiding competition with private business interests. Demand-side subsi- 
dies were rejected on the assumptions that they were unworkable, more 
costly, and ineffective in creating additional housing. In addition, New 
Deal politicians thought that such subsidies would fail to eliminate sub- 
standard housing, and would only cause an increase in the number of 
families on the relief rolls.65 Conversely, contemporary proponents of 
the demand-side subsidies approach argue that such subsidies would en- 
courage both rehabilitation of existing housing and construction of new 
tenants. See infra text accompanying notes 303-13 (discussing the various rules and poli- 
cies adopted toward these ends). 
63. See John R. Nolon, Reexamining Federal Housing Programs in a Time of Fiscal 
Austerity: The Trend Toward Block Grants and Housing Allowances, 14 URB. LAW. 249, 
250 (1982) (summarizing public housing proposals made during the Reagan 
administration). 
64. See id.; see also R. Allen Hays, Housing Subsidy Strategies in the United States: A 
Typology, in HANDBOOK OF HOUSING, supra note 4, at 183,188-89; J. Paul Mitchell, The 
Historical Context for Housing Policy, in FEDERAL HOUSING POLICY AND PROGRAMS 3.3- 
17 (J. Paul Mitchell ed., 1985) (discussing federal housing programs in the post-World War 
I1 era); Pit & van Vliet, supra note 4, at 200 (explaining various definitions of public hous- 
ing); Simons, supra note 4, at 264-68 (reviewing the shift from supply-side to demand-side 
housing subsidies during the 1980s). 
65. See Marc Bendick. Jr. & Raymond J. Struyk, Origins of An Experimental Ap- 
proach, in HOUSING VOUCHERS FOR THE POOR: LESSONS FROM A NATIONAL EXPERIMENT 
23.25-26 (Raymond J. Struyk & Marc Bendick, Jr. eds., 1981) (explaining the advantages 
and disadvantages of demand-side housing allowances); see also Bernard J. Frieden, The 
Housing Allowance as a Subsidy Approach, in HANDBOOK OF HOUSING, supra note 4, at 
237, 237 (same). 
Heinonline - -  43 Catholic U. L. Rev. 693 1993-1994 
694 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 43:681 
housing, since these payments would increase the demand for housing.66 
Furthermore, proponents argue that demand-side subsidies would pro- 
vide benefits that could be limited to the persons, amounts, and time peri- 
ods actually needed, thereby avoiding the stigma of providing "housing 
relief."67 
1. Public Housing 
Congress adopted the federal public housing program advocated dur- 
ing the New Deal through the enactment of the Housing Act of 1937, 
which incorporated programs in the broad category of public hou~ing.~' 
While federally funded in part, public housing is owned directly by Public 
Housing Agencies ( P H A S ) , ~ ~  which are local municipal corporations cre- 
ated pursuant to state legislation for the purpose of constructing, owning, 
and operating housing for low-income ho~seholds.'~ Under the Housing 
Act, a PHA and the federal government execute a contract setting out 
their respective rights and  obligation^.^' The PHA finances the land 
purchase and housing construction by issuing long-term bonds, which typ- 
ically have a forty-year maturity.72 The federal government subsidizes 
the project by assuming all debt service payments on the bonds or by 
making direct loans and grants to fund the construction of public hous- 
- - - - - - - - 
66. See Bendick & Struyk, supra note 65, at 25. 
67. Id. at 26. In 1953, Congress reconsidered demand-side strategies, but once again 
acted in favor of retaining a supply-side framework featuring in-kind~benefits. Id. at 25; 
see PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COMM. ON GOV'T HOUS. POLICIES AND PROGRAMS, GOVERN- 
MENT HOUSING POLICIES AND PROGRAMS 5-20 (1953) (stating that any action taken by the 
government would support "a strong, free, [and] competitive economy"). In 1968, a presi- 
dential commission appointed to study housing programs and their impact on households 
and housing markets recommended an experiment using the demand-side housing allow- 
ance approach. PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON URBAN HOUS., A DECENT HOME 14 (1968). See 
infra notes 93-104 and accompanying text (discussing the experiment). The committee 
based its recommendation on the fact that increasing suburban resistance to public housing 
projects was forcing such projects into urban slum areas. PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON URBAN 
~ o u s . ,  supra. This raisedconcerns over the "ghettoization" of the poor and minority ben- 
eficiaries of public housing. See id. The committee believed that a housing allowance sys- 
tem would reduce economic dependence on slum housing by increasing demand for 
standard units, thereby inducing suppliers to upgrade slum properties or commence new 
construction. See id. 
68. ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437 et seq. (1988)). 
69. 42 U.S.C. $1 1437a-1437e, 1437g-1437m (1988). 
70. Id. A PHA is typically governed by a board of commissioners appointed by the 
mayor and city council of the jurisdiction in which it is located. The administration of the 
PHA is usually vested in an executive or managing director and his or her staff. Id. 
1437a(b)(6). 
71. Id. $8 1437b-1437~. 
72. Id. 5 1437b(a). 
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ing.73 Initially, only construction and financing costs were paid by the 
government, leaving operating and maintenance costs to be covered by 
rents collected from public housing tenants. In the 1960s, however, sharp 
increases in operating and maintenance costs prompted PHAs to defer 
maintenance while still charging higher rents. In response to this trend, 
Congress originally imposed a rent ceiling of twenty-five percent of a ten- 
ant's income, and began providing operating subsidies to PHAs.'~ 
2. Section 8 Existing Housing Program 
The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 created the 
Section 8 program.75 Originally, the Program comprised several sub- 
programs, including new construction, substantial rehabilitation, and ex- 
isting housing.76 Under the Section 8 Program, housing is owned by 
private parties who enter into contracts with PHAs to provide the hous- 
ing to eligible low-income fa mi lie^?^ In exchange, the private owners re- 
ceive direct government payments equal to the difference between the 
fair market rent on the Section 8 housing and the rent that the tenant can 
afford to pay, an amount limited to thirty percent of the tenant's in- 
c0me.7~ Housing will qualify as Section 8 housing when the units meet 
government quality standards and have a market rental value no greater 
than an amount that HUD determines to represent a fair market rent for 
suitable housing in that 10cality.7~ 
Under the Section 8 Housing Voucher Program, low-income families 
are given vouchers to obtain housing in the private market. The amount 
of the voucher represents fair market rent, but recipients may pay more if 
they choose to spend more of their own funds, or may pay less and keep 
the difference, provided that they find a unit in suitable condition. The 
73. Id. 
74. Hays, supra note 64, at 184. 
75. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, sec. 201, 
$5 1-12, 88 Stat. 633, 662 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 9 1437f (1988)). This Act 
eliminated most of the previously established urban development programs, including the 
Urban Renewal Program and most housing subsidy programs. The Act also expanded 
local governments' control over the use of federal housing funds by providing block grants 
under the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program. Professor Nolon ar- 
gues that because of the 1974 Act, these funds were used less frequently for functions, and 
therefore, less control was exercised over housing providers. See Nolon, supra note 63, at 
255-56. 
76. Spending authority for the new construction program slowly dwindled until its ulti- 
mate repeal in 1983. Housing and Urban Rural Recovery Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-181, 
97 Stat. 1181 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 5 1437f (1988)). 
77. 42 U.S.C. 0 14371 (1988). 
78. Id.; 24 C.F.R. $5 882.106.882.105 (1993). The Section 8 Existing Housing Program 
is administered by PHAs. 
79. 42 U.S.C. 8 14376 24 C.F.R. gB882.106, 882.105. 
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vouchers do not correspond to any specific unit." 
3. Subsidized Housing 
Beginning in the early 1960s and continuing through the 1970s, federal 
housing efforts focused on two programs within the context of subsidized 
housing. Under the first, the federal government provided capital subsi- 
dies for housing construction for the elderly and handicapped." Under 
the second, the federal government provided low-interest mortgage loans 
to private housing developers, who were required to offer housing to low- 
income families at a rate below the market rental rate.'= 
- - - - 
80. 42 U;S.C. 9 1437fr 
81. See Housing Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-372, 5 202, 73 Stat. 654, 667 (codified as 
amended at 12 U.S.C. 5 1701q (1988)). 
82. Under section 221(d)(3) of the Housing Act of 1954, ch. 649,68 Stat. 590,601, the 
Below Market Interest Rate Program (BMIR) provided subsidies in the form of low-inter- 
est mortgage loans to private housing developers. Savings were to be passed to lower- 
income tenants. 12 U.S.C. 6 17151(d)(2) (1988). Eligible participants included private non- 
profit sponsors, public sponsors, limited dividend corporations, and cooperative~. 12 
U.S.C. 17151(d)(3) (1988). Regulations require eligible housing projects for nonprofit 
sponsors to consist of 10 or more units that were either "detached, semi-detached, or row 
houses, or multi-family structures." 24 C.F.R. 5 221.545(b)(l) (1970). Once the mortgage 
was paid in full, the property owner could withdraw from the program and be released 
from the affordability restrictions. 9 221(e), 68 Stat. at 601. The program was phased out 
in 1968. At that time, the total number of units in the program represented only one 
percent of the total volume of private construction. See Hays, supra note 64, at 188; Randi 
L. Engel, Comment, Critical Housing Needs and the Emergency Low Income Housing 
Preservation Act of 1987: A Short-Term Solution to a Long-Term Problem, 40 EMORY L.J. 
163, 169-72 (1991). 
The Section 236 Program replaced the Section 221(d)(3) Program. Housing and Urban 
Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 9 201(a), 82 Stat. 476, 498. Under this 
section,-Congress provided funding for federal mortgage insurance and subsidized interest 
payments to lenders. Id. at 498-99. Nonprofit organizations, limited-dividend sponsors, 
and cooperatives remained eligible participants. Eligible housing projects for all partici- 
pants were required to consist of five or more units that were either "detached, semide- 
tached, or row construction" and offered at affordable rental rates. See Housing and 
Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 9 201(a), 90 Stat. 476, 498. The 
program allowed owners to prepay their mortgages in full after 20 years, withdraw from 
the program after such prepayment, and be released from affordability and use restrictions. 
Section 236 was eliminated during the 1973 Nixon moratorium on subsidized housing pro- 
grams. At that time, 142,000 units had been constructed with section 236 funding and more 
than one-half million units had been issued section 236 financing or contract authority. 
The Emergency Low Income Housing Preservation Act of 1987 was enacted "(1) to 
preserve and-retain to the maximum extent practicable as housing affordable to low in- 
come families or persons those privately owned dwelling units that were produced for such 
purpose with Federal assistance; [and] (2) to minimize the involuntary displacement of 
tenants currently residing in such housing." Pub. L. No. 100-242, 5 202(b)(1)-(2). 101 Stat. 
1877, 1878 (1988) (superseded in the general revision of the Emergency Low Income 
Housing Preservation Act of 1987 by Pub. L. No. 101-625,s 601(a), 104 Stat. 4249 (1990)). 
The Act placed conditions on a property owner's right to prepay her mortgage and with- 
draw from other requirements of the program, including the lower income affordability 
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4. Demand-Side Subsidies 
During the 1980s, political and ideological trends caused a shift in the 
focus of federal housing efforts toward demand-side subsidies. Demand- 
side subsidies, such as mortgage insuranceg3 and tax are pro- 
grams intended to benefit all persons, regardless of income level or need. 
Specifically, these subsidies include measures designed for "lower income 
families," defined by law as "families whose incomes do not exceed 80 
per centum of the median income for the area."85 
and use restrictions. Id. 5 221. The Act was replaced by the Low Income Housing Preser- 
vation and Resident Homeownership Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-625,s 601(a), 104 Stat. 
4249 (codified at 12 U.S.C. 8 4101 et seq. (Supp. V 1993)). Among other things, the Act 
offered fair market value incentives to private owners to continue to use their property as 
low-income housing projects but retained restrictions on prepayment of mortgages. Id. 
83. The FHA program, under the National Housing Act, along with the Veterans Ad- 
ministration (VA), under the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, provide private 
loans for housing. 12 U.S.C. $8 1701-1750g (1988). The FHA mortgage insurance program 
covers low-equity loans, sets interest rate ceilings, and establishes uniform lending criteria. 
The program was instrumental in originating and standardizing the long-term self-amortiz- 
ing fixed-rate mortgage, thus increasing the potential market for mortgages and the possi- 
bility of homeownership. Lily M. Hoffman & Barbara S. Heisler, Home Finance: Buying 
and Keeping a House in a Changing Financial Environment, in HANDBOOK OF HOUSING, 
supra note 4, at 149, 152. 
The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), 12 U.S.C. $ 5  1716-172331 
(1988), and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), 12 U.S.C. 
$ 5  1451-1459 (1988), also purchase loans made by private lenders. Hoffman & Heisler, 
supra, at 152-53. Fannie Mae was originally intended to draw more funds into the residen- 
tial housing market, to redistribute these funds regionally, and to insulate housing markets 
from monetary and fiscal policy. Id. In the secondary market, " 'lenders can sell or trade 
the loans they originate, thus lowering their risk while allowing them to retain fees for 
continuing to service the loans.' " Id. (citation omitted). Freddie Mac was established in 
1970 as a subsidiary to the Federal Home Loan Bank system to establish a pass-through 
program for conventional mortgages. Id. at 153. 
The government purchases mortgages made by private lenders through the Government 
National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae). 12 U.S.C. $§ 1716-1723h (1988). Ginnie 
Mae buys and packages FHANA-insured mortgages and sells them directly to investors, 
creating a pass-through by guaranteeing principal and interest to the ultimate investor, and 
servicing fees to the originator. Id. 8 1721(g); see Charles L. Edson, Picblic Assistance for 
Housing-Past, Present, and Future, 3 PUB. L. F. 77 (1983) (discussing the role of the gov- 
ernment as a purchaser of mortgages made by private lenders). 
84. The tax benefits include: a deduction for home mortgage interest and real prop- 
erty taxes, I.R.C. §§ 163, 164 (1988). the deferral of capital gains tax upon the sale of one 
principal residence house and purchase of another within two years, id. § 1034, and the 
nonrecognition of capital gain upon the sale of a home by persons over the age of 55. Id. 
§ 121. 
85. 42 U.S.C. 1437a(b)(2) (1988). In general, occupancy of public housing is limited 
to "lower income families." Id. The class of lower income families is divided into two 
subclasses: low income families, whose incomes are from 80% to 50% of the median, and 
very low income families, whose incomes are below 50% of the median. Id. 
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The rent supplements programs6 is one example of the demand-side 
appr~ach. '~ Under this program, the government makes rent payments 
on behalf of low-income families, enabling them to occupy housing units 
built by private nonprofit or limited dividend  corporation^.^^ These units 
are financed by FHA-insured mortgages bearing interest at the market 
rate. The rent supplement payment is determined by the amount neces- 
sary for the eligible family to fulfill its rental obligations, an amount that 
exceeds thirty percent of the family's income.s9 The program was 
designed to provide decent housing for low-income families while stimu- 
lating private sector housing investment in urban areas.90 Although still 
in existence, the rent supplement program remains small, restricted to 
renters of units in housing projects that already receive federal mortgage 
subsidies under other federal  program^.^' 
B. Experiment with Cash Housing Allowances 
In 1970, Congress authorized an experimental housing allowance pro- 
gram (EHAP), a form of demand-side The program provided 
cash payments to low-income families for the purpose of securing rental 
housing in the private market.93 While the theory of direct subsidies pro- 
- - 
86. Pub. L. No. 89-117.5 101(a), 79 Stat. 451 (1965) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. 
1701s (1988)). 
87. The Section 23 Leasing Program is another demand-side program through which 
local housing agencies lease privately owned and managed dwelling units, which are then 
subleased to low-income families at a subsidized rental charge. Housing and Urban Devel- 
opment Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-117, 103(a), 79 Stat. 451, 455 (amending the United 
States Housing Act of 1937 which was superseded in the 1974 general revision of the Act 
by Pub. L. No. 93-383,88 Stat. 633 (1974)). This program was phased out by the Housing 
and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 5 201(a), 88 Stat. 653. 
88. 12 U.S.C. § 1701s (1988). 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-609 504(a), 84 
Stat. 1770, 1786. 
93. During the period from January 1971 through March 1972, HUD worked with the 
Urban Institute to design and implement an EHAP. Frieden, si~pra note 65, at 237. The 
experiment began in 1973 and ended in 1980, involved more than 25,000 families in 12 
cities, and cost over $160 million. Id. The program was open to individual elderly and 
handicapped persons and families of two or more people. Id. at 238. It set income eligibil- 
ity standards, taking the local cost of adequate housing and the size of the household into 
account. Id. The maximum income limit for a family of four was less than $7000. Id. The 
housing allowance payments were equivalent to the difference between the estimated cost 
of adequate housing and 25% of the family's income. Id. Payments averaged $75 per 
month. Id. The program permitted families to spend more or less than the estimated cost 
of housing, so long as the housing met minimum quality standards set by the experiment. 
Id. 
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viding for basic human needs generally prevails in our welfare system, in 
the case of housing, this demand-side strategy failed. 
The EHAP had three components: the demand experiment, the supply 
experiment, and the administrative agency e ~ p e r i m e n t . ~ ~  The demand 
experiment analyzed the degree of satisfaction among families who par- 
ticipated in the e~periment.~' It examined the choices families made with 
respect to the quality and location of their housing and the degree of their 
satisfaction with these  choice^.'^ The supply experiment tested the effects 
of cash allowances on the cost and quality of housing, on the behavior of 
landlords and realtors, and on the patterns of residential m~bility.~' The 
administrative agency experiment tested the performance of agencies in 
screening and enrolling applicants, certifying eligibility, providing coun- 
seling, and making household  inspection^.'^ 
In the demand experiment, researchers found that less than half of the 
eligible families actually participated in the program." Cash allowances 
were shown to have little, if any, impact on a family's choice of living 
location, the economic or racial concentration in available locations, or 
the quality of neighborhoods in which participating families lived.''' Re- 
searchers discovered that the EHAP experiment did not result in a pro- 
94. The demand experiment was conducted in Pittsburgh and Phoenix. Id. at 238. 
The supply experiment was conducted in Green Bay, Wisconsin and South Bend, Indiana. 
Id. The administrative agency experiment selected eight different agencies in different cit- 
ies around the country. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 238-39. 
99. Id. at 247. Studies attempted to explain this phenomenon by suggesting that some 
people were content with their original choice of living arrangements. Id. Others pro- 
posed that some people doubted whether their homes could pass the inspection or whether 
the landlord would agree to rent to people in the program. Id. People were concerned 
about the stigma associated with the program and possible demeaning treatment by agency 
personnel. Id. Moreover, searching for a new home was burdensome, administrative pro- 
cedures were overwhelming, and the housing standards set were very high. Id. Further- 
more, minority families were less likely than other enrollees to meet the standards for 
payment. Hartman, supra note 15, at 370. 
100. Bendick & Struyk, supra note 65, at 107-08. Program participants were generally 
reluctant to move. Frieden, supra note 65, at 245. A sizable portion of the participating 
families, however, did move: 45% in the administrative experiment cities, 39% in the de- 
mand experiment cities, and 16% in the supply experiment cities. Id. Although the re- 
corded information was "scattered," it showed that people who moved tended to enter 
better neighborhoods. Id. at 245-46. Generally, "most people who moved went into cen- 
sus tracts with a higher socioeconomic index rating (based on resident income, education, 
and employment) than the places they left. Of black households who moved, 30 percent 
moved to areas with lower minority concentrations than their original neighborhoods." Id. 
at 246. The program, however, did not present significant opportunities to poor families 
living in suburban areas. Id. 
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portional increase in the overall satisfaction with the housing experience, 
including the location and quality of ho~sing.'~' Furthermore, in at least 
half the cases, the cash allowances failed to reduce the rent payment to an 
amount within twenty-five percent of the family's income.lo2 
In the supply experiment, researchers found no substantial expansion 
or improvement in the quality of housing stock,'03 or in the overall condi- 
tion of cities. Nor did the experiment result in any major increases in 
freedom of choice in housing.lo4 
C. Eficacy of the Forms of Assistance 
A comparison of housing programs in the first three categories (public 
housing, Section 8 Existing Housing, and subsidized housing) with those 
in the fourth group (demand-side subsidies) reveals that the former have 
a greater impact on housing supply and quality. The value of Section 8 
Existing Housing Program certificates, however, is limited by the willing- 
ness of private landowners to enter into contracts with local PHAs.'OS 
101. Frieden, supra note 65, at 248. Under the program, "a 10 percent increase in in- 
come for renters led to only a 1.9 percent increase in rent payments." Id. Moreover, the 
majority of the housing allowance was used to obtain goods and services, with only 25% of 
the allowance used to obtain better housing. Hartman, supra note 15, at 370. 
102. Frieden, supra note 65, at 243. 
103. The experiment produced virtually no effect on housing costs, either increases or 
decreases, nor did it stimulate new construction or rehabilitation (beyond minor repairs). 
Id. at 248-49; Hartman, supra note 15, at 371. Repairs that were undertaken were ex- 
tremely modest in scope. Bendick & Struyk, supra note 65, at 187; Frieden, supra note 65, 
at 244. Windows were fixed and handrails were installed on stairs. Id. Some work, how- 
ever, was done on certain structural components, such as plumbing and heating systems. 
Id. at 244-45. "Three out of four below-standard dwellings were brought up to an accepta- 
ble level at cash costs of less than $25 in Green Bay and less than $30 in South Bend." Id. 
at 245. 
104. Frieden, supra note 65, at 245. In general, the Program V Report drew similar but 
somewhat more positive conclusions. 
Public housing units had only slightly lower value than the housing units occu- 
pied by voucher recipients in Pittsburgh and Phoenix when value is expressed as 
an estimated rent. Public housing was less likely than private market housing to 
have physical deficiencies relating to health and safety of occupants, but public 
housing tenants were also less likely to express satisfaction with their units and, 
especially, with their neighborhoods. 
The offer of a voucher to public housing tenants in South Bend resulted in, at 
most, a slight increase in public housing vacancies and a slight decrease in the size 
of the public housing waiting list. 
PROGRAM V, supra note 6, at 325. 
105. The New York Times recently reported on the success of the "Underground Rail- 
road" in Chicago. Jason DeParle, An Underground Railroad From Projects to Suburbs, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1,1993, at Al .  This "Underground Railroad" is a national program that 
provides inner-city families Section 8 certificates to move to the suburbs. Id. 
A large percentage of minority households and families with children were unable to use 
Heinonline - -  43 Catholic U. L. Rev. 700 1993-1994 
19941 Public Housing Tenancy 701 
The program has an even smaller impact on the housing market when 
there are relatively few certificates available.lo6 
While the goal of demand-side subsidies is to increase the demand for 
housing, thereby increasing supply as the market responds, the EHAP 
experiment showed that, in fact, such subsidies have no significant effect 
on the housing construction industry. Moreover, subsidies do not neces- 
sarily increase the supply of affordable housing or improve the quality of 
existing housing. Instead, the experiment demonstrated that cash al- 
lowances became income supplements for low-income families already 
living in good housing. Conversely, if a family did not live in good hous- 
ing, it was unlikely that the family would be able to take advantage of the 
program either by moving to better housing or by inducing the property 
owner to upgrade the physical condition of their current housing.lo7 Fur- 
thermore, racial and class discrimination, combined with housing 
shortages, continued to prevent low-income families from moving into 
better, more integrated neighborhoods, offsetting the real value of cash 
a l l o ~ a n c e s . ' ~ ~  As the EHAP experiment apparently illustrates, demand- 
side subsidies often benefit those least in need-builders, lenders, mid- 
dle-class homeowners, and low-income families at the upper end of the 
eligibility range.lo9 
A tenant's ability to pay market rent through the receipt of a demand- 
side subsidy does not directly alter the behavior of private builders and 
landowners in improving the quantity and quality of available housing. 
Instead, a tenant must rely upon the various principles of private lease 
their Section 8 Existing Housing certificates. Hartman, supra note 15, at 372. The Presi- 
dent's Commission on Housing reported that large families, single-parent households, and 
minority families are less likely to participate in the Section 8 Existing Housing Program. 
THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION O  HOUSING 26-27 (1982). 
106. During the previous two presidential administrations, HUD's budget for public 
housing was cut by two-thirds. As a result, there was no new authority for housing assist- 
ance in 1986. In 1987, budget authority existed for only 50,000 housing vouchers, while in 
1988, such authority existed for only 79,000 vouchers. By 1988, HUD's budget provided 
for only 3000 units of new construction subsidy. See Lowry, supra note 15, at 94. 
107. See Hartman, supra note 15, at 372. 
108. See MARC BENDICK, JR. & JAMES P. ZAIS, INCOMES AND HOUSING: LESSONS 
FROM EXPERIMENTS WITH HOUSING ALLOWANCES 2 (Urban Institute ed., 1978). 
109. These demand-side subsidies also can be criticized because they offered families 
little choice in deciding where to live. To receive the benefit of the subsidy, eligible fami- 
lies had to move to a development of a government selected sponsor. Frieden, supra note 
65, at 240. As a result, "allocation of subsidized housing to communities across the country 
did not correspond as much to the needs of low-income residents as it did to the energy, 
activity, and political muscle of local sponsors." Id. 
Heinonline - -  43 Catholic U. L. Rev. 701 1993-1994 
702 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 43:681 
law to achieve these ends. Two private lease law principles that have his- 
torically barred low-income families from access to safe, decent, and af- 
fordable housing are still in existence. These are the "no-repair" rule and 
the "termination or nonrenewal without cause" rule. The no-repair rule 
emerged from the common law concept of the lease as a conveyance, 
through which the tenant received an estate in the premises. The natural 
conclusion under this legal framework is that, absent an express agree- 
ment to the contrary, the landlord is not concerned with the condition of 
the premises.'1° The termination or nonrenewal without cause rule in- 
volves an aspect of the duration of occupancy provisions most commonly 
used in urban leases-the tenancy for years"' and the periodic ten- 
ancy.'12 Under both, the tenant receives the right to exclusive possession 
of the property for a stated period of time (the term or period). In a 
tenancy for years, the landlord is entitled to resume possession of the 
property at the end of the stated term. In a periodic tenancy, the landlord 
may resume possession at the end of the period only after notifying the 
tenant."3 
110. See infra notes 150-72 and accompanying text. 
111. The tenancy for years first appeared in England at the end of the 12th century. 
William M. McGovern, The Historical Conception of a Lease for Years, 23 UCLA L. REV. 
501, 501 (1976). Initially, the tenancy for years was not regarded as a freehold, a posses- 
sory interest in land, but rather as a chattel. Id. at 526-27. As such, the tenant for years 
had only a personal claim against the lessor and could not sue third parties for injury to the 
land or for disseisin. Id. at 505-06. The tenancy for years became common only later in 
the Middle Ages when many of the ideas associated with "feudalism" had disappeared. Id. 
at 504. By that time, tenants acquired better remedies, such as the action in ejectment, 
than those given to freeholders. Id. at 520, 526 (citing A.W.B. SIMPSON, AN INTRODUC- 
TION TO THE HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW 136 (1961)). Based on the availability of the 
remedy of ejectment, the tenant for years was considered to have an interest in real prop- 
erty, the result of a conveyance, but only during the term. Id. at 527-28. 
112. In a periodic tenancy, the landlord-tenant relationship begins with a fixed period 
and continues by successive like periods until the tenancy is terminated. See CORNELIUS J. 
MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 65 (2d ed. 1988). 
113. Either party is free to terminate a periodic tenancy at the end of a period. Id. at 
66. Termination, however, requires notice. At common law, the required notice for a ten- 
ancy from year to year was six months. Id. at 65. For shorter lease periods, the required 
notice was equal to the term of the lease. Currently, most statutes require only 30 days 
notice. A tenancy for years ends upon its terms and does not require notice for termina- 
tion. Id. at 58. Where a tenant remains in possession after the expiration of a tenancy for 
years, an implied periodic tenancy is created in many jurisdictions. Id. at 67. For a com- 
plete discussion of the periodic tenancy and the tenancy for years, see generally CHARLES 
DONAHUE, JR. ET AL., PROPERTY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPT AND THE INSTITU- 
TION 435, 676-80 (3d ed. 1993) (periodic tenancy and holdover tenants); THEODORE F.T. 
PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 570-74 (5th ed. 1956) (tenancy 
for years); ROBERT S. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT §§ 2:10 
to :15 (1980 & Supp. 1994) (periodic tenancy); A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE LAND 
LAW 235-37 (2d ed. 1986) (periodic tenancy). 
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Recent doctrinal changes, to some degree, have disturbed the tradi- 
tional principles of private lease law. As a result, new burdens have been 
imposed on the landlord, such that "[tlenants' rights have increased dra- 
matically; landlords' rights have decreased dramati~ally.""~ These doc- 
trinal changes, particularly as they developed from Supreme Court 
decisions interpreting New Deal legislation, reflect the overall jurispru- 
dential transition from classical to neo-classical legal thought. Prior to 
the New Deal era, the majority of the Court expansively read the Four- 
teenth Amendment Due Process Clause while narrowly construing Con- 
gress' commerce and taxing power. These judicial philosophies limited 
the range of governmental involvement in private economic decisionmak- 
ing,"' threatening those New Deal programs that proposed to expand 
the existing scope of congressional, presidential, or federal administrative 
a~thority."~ In the mid-1930s, however, the Supreme Court abruptly 
narrowed its views on substantive due process and freedom of contract, 
thus permitting greater governmental intervention in private com- 
merce."' New Deal programs such as social security and public housing 
114. Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes 
and Consequences, 69 CORNELL . REV. 517, 519 (1984). See generally Symposium, The 
Revolution in Residential Landlord Tenant Law: Causes and Consequences, 69 CORNELL .
REV. 517 (1984) (tracing the development of landlord and tenant rights). 
115. Parrish, supra note 27, at 728-29. Parrish's work provides an insightful review of 
the constitutional revolution that took place in the 1930s. In significant rulings, the 
Supreme Court struck down state and federal laws attempting to alter the existing legal 
order. Id. Such laws prescribed minimum standards for employment and attempted to 
regulate manufacturing. Id. at 728. 
116. Id. at 730-31. The Court invalidated the National Industrial Recovery Act and the 
Frazier-Lemke Farm Relief Act and sought to require President Roosevelt to obtain the 
specific approval of Congress before using his power to remove members of independent 
regulatory commissions. Id. at 731; see LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 37, at 231-74 (d' ISCUSS- 
ing judicial restriction of New Deal programs). 
117. See generally KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HIS- 
TORY (1989) (reviewing the Supreme Court's policy reversal during the New Deal era). 
Many theories attempt to explain the Supreme Court's apparent reversal. Parrish con- 
tends that the reversal could have resulted from "the fact that statutes were more carefully 
drafted as the emergency of the Hundred Days passed and as the administration recruited 
more experienced legislative draftsmen." Parrish, supra note 27, at 732. Alternatively, he 
suggests that the Court did not reverse its position at all, but rather, "before and after 1937 
the justices engaged in scrupulous line-drawing between acceptable and unacceptable regu- 
latory schemes." Id. Parrish writes: 
In the final analysis, both the impasse and its solution were more political than 
doctrinal. [Justices] Hughes and Roberts, both moderate Republicans, looked 
upon many of the New Deal's reforms and some state level programs as radical, 
especially with respect to the redistribution of social and economic power. 
Other old progressives . . . fought the New Deal for these same reasons after 
1935. By joining with the conservative justices in 1935-36, Hughes and Roberts 
hoped to portray FDR and his advisers as dangerous subversives who were tam- 
pering with constitutional verities. . . . Faced with a choice between an administra- 
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reflected this shift. As these new entitlements became embodied in fed- 
eral legislation, the receipt of assistance to meet basic human needs be- 
came viewed not as a matter of charity, but of right.l18 
The new rights created by New Deal programs triggered the develop- 
ment of new legal theories. These new theories affected existing common 
law theories, as courts were increasingly asked to construe statutes and 
regulations to decide issues once governed exclusively by common law 
rules.llg In contract law (from which private lease law borrowed heav- 
ily), legislation and regulation removed some contract matters, such as 
insurance, labor, wages, product pricing and standards, from the free 
market altogether. Consequently, there was a decided shift from private 
to public regulation of economic decisionmaking. Contrary to the pre- 
Depression classical period, "public policy" became as significant a factor 
in interpreting contracts as the parties' private bargain itself. The neo- 
classical notion of unconscionability circumscribed the range of judicially 
enforceable private agreements, narrowing a party's ability to limit or dis- 
claim liability to within the bounds of public concern.120 Consequently, 
tion that had arrested the economic decline and a group of Justices who argued 
that this administration often behaved unconstitutionally, the voters placed their 
immediate self-interest above abstract lawyers' arguments. Roosevelt's landslide 
[in 19361 left Hughes and Roberts with no alternative but capitulation. 
Id. at 733-34. 
Other aspects of the Court's work during the decade had profound and lasting signifi- 
cance, including civil liberties and civil rights decisions, federal habeas corpus relief, and 
the expansion of the in forma pauperis docket. Id. at 734-35. 
118. These new-found "rights" have never achieved the same status as those originating 
in the common law. Instead, they are qualified as "entitlements." The array of claims that 
Americans assert against the government, however, is quite diverse, leading to a descrip- 
tion of American society as 
built around entitlement. The automobile dealer has his franchise, the doctor and 
lawyer their professional licenses, the worker his union membership, contract, 
and pension rights, the executive his contract and stock options; all are devices to 
aid security and independence. Many of the most important of these entitlements 
now flow from government: subsidies to farmers and businessmen, routes for air- 
lines and channels for television stations; long term contracts for defense, space, 
and education; social security pensions for individuals. Such sources of security, 
whether private or public, are no longer regarded as luxuries or gratuities; to the 
recipients they are essentials, fully deserved, and in no sense a form of charity. It 
is only the poor whose entitlements, although recognized by public policy, have 
not been effectively enforced. 
Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 
YALE L.J. 1245,1255 (1965), quoted in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,262 n.8 (1970); see 
Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) (examining the growth of 
government entitlement programs). 
119. See HALL. supra note 117. at 292-95. 
120. For a discussion of the movement of law away from the late-nineteenth century 
faith in objectivity and formalism, see HALL, supra note 117, at 297. Unconscionability as 
a bar to enforceability has been incorporated into the Uniform Commercial Code at 9 2- 
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caveat emptor, to some extent, was eclipsed by new concerns of fairness 
and efficiency.12' 
A. Reasons for the Revolution in Private Lease Law 
The transition in private lease law reached its greatest momentum in 
the 1960s. Professor Rabin offers four reasons for the pace and nature of 
the "revolutionary" transition.lZ2 First, he explains that "some of the 
more well-known changes [in private lease law] strike at the core of the 
landlord-tenant relationship, both in legal and practical terms."lZ3 These 
include limitations on the landlord's right to determine the amount of 
rent, to gain possession when the term ends, and to select tenants, in ad- 
dition to limitations on the parties' right to decide the extent of landlord 
services.124 Second, Rabin states that "both courts and legislatures have 
significantly participated in the rev~lution." '~~ Third, Rabin explains that 
the doctrinal changes have been rapid, with the most significant move- 
ment occurring between 1968 and 1973.lZ6 Finally, and what Rabin refers 
to as the "most important" reason, "almost all of the changes have fa- 
vored the tenant as against the landlord."127 Specifically, these doctrinal 
changes have produced and influenced the development of an implied 
warranty of habitability, rent control legislation, an expansion of the 
landlord's tort liability, antidiscrimination laws, limitations on the land- 
lord's right to evict, and limitations on the landlord's right of self-help.128 
Professor Rabin argues that the civil rights movement was the motivat- 
ing factor behind this transformation because it "created a climate of ac- 
tivism that demanded prompt, dramatic changes."lZ9 Another factor he 
recognizes is the resistance to the Vietnam War and the influence of the 
antiwar protestors' victory over the "establishment" on the American 
political a tm~sphe re . ' ~~  Rabin also identifies institutional and legal 
302. U.C.C. 8 2-302, 1A U.L.A. 15-16 (1989). See U.C.C. 88 2-316(1) and 2-316(2), 1A 
U.L.A. 465 (1989) for limitations on disclaimers. 
121. Notwithstanding the proclamation of "The Death of Contract" in 1974, contracts 
continue to sustain important social and economic relationships though limited by new 
concepts. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 5 (1974). 
122. Rabin, supra note 114, at 521. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. See infra notes 150-213 and accompanying text. 
129. Rabin, supra note 114, at 546-47; see Glendon, supra note 25, at 511 (giving some 
credit for private lease law developments to legal services organizations challenging the old 
regime). 
130. Rabin, supra note 114, at 550. 
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changes that affected landlord tenant relations. In particular, he high- 
lights reapportionment, which realigned state legislatures to reflect urban 
constituencies, therefore bringing urban grievances to the public atten- 
tion.13' Developments in legal theory, precedents, and legislation that 
provided tenants with enforceable rights as to the condition of the prem- 
ises were also ~ignificant. '~~ Finally, Professor Rabin cites the economic 
basis for the transformation. He states that the economic health of the 
nation during this era "made it seem feasible to launch and win a 'war 
against poverty'. . . . Judges and legislators believed that landlords could 
afford to give up some of their profits for the benefit of slum dwellers 
because the landlord's economic position, like that of everyone else, was 
impr~ving." '~~ 
Professor Friedman does not agree that a "revolution" in private lease 
- 
law 0 ~ c u r r e d . l ~ ~  Rather, he suggests that the change developed because 
the modern "modal fact situations" differ significantly from the older 
cases that formed the basis of private lease law.135 Professor Friedman 
notes that until the 1960s, there were few contemporary-style apartment 
buildings, and thus, little case law concerning them.136 Consequently, the 
law that did exist applied loosely to contemporary residential and com- 
mercial property leases.13' "Impressions about the 'revolution' in land- 
lord-tenant law," Professor Friedman contends, "are reinforced by 
looking at parallel changes in other fields of law."13* 
In an important work that preceded Professor Rabin's article, Profes- 
131. Id. at 550-51. 
132. Id. at 551-53. 
133. Id. at 554. 
134. Lawrence M. Friedman, Comments on Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Resi- 
dential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes and Consequences, 69 CORNELL . REV. 585, 585 
(1984). 
135. Id. 
136. Id. at 586. He states that "none of the earlier cases involved slum poverty." Id. at 
585. 
137. Id. at 586. For example, the remedy of distraint would apply more appropriately 
in an agricultural community; it could permit a landlord to enter the land and gather crops 
and livestock. Id. It would be viewed quite differently if it permitted a landlord to enter 
an apartment and "start rummaging around in the drawers and closets for jewelry and 
furs." Id. Professor Friedman rejects the notion that the greatest impetus for the private 
lease law movement was concern over slum housing and problems of dilapidation, human 
suffering, and violations of housing codes. Id. Instead, he argues that wealthy tenants, 
who did not receive what they thought they contracted for from their landlords, influenced 
the law. Id. at 586-87. He suggests "that the trend Professor Rabin describes is largely 
independent of class and political ideology. Otherwise, why would the new rules be SO 
uncommonly infectious?" Id. at 587. 
138. Id. at 588. For other comments on the doctrinal changes occurring in private lease 
law, see Charles Donahue, Jr., Change in the American Law of Landlord and Tenant, 37 
MOD. L. REV. 242 (1974). See aLFo Cunningham, supra note 23. 
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sor Glendon argues that the so-called "revolution" in private lease law 
"appears, in historical perspective, to have been no more or less than the 
culmination, in one area of the law, of certain long-standing trends that 
have transformed not only landlord-tenant law, but private law generally 
over the past century."139 This was a trend away from private ordering 
and toward public regulation.'+"' While property law never completely 
encompassed lease law, by the turn of the century, and up to the 1960s, 
lease law employed real and personal property principles as well as some 
contract notions.14' Over the course of the twentieth century, lease law 
principles began to reflect modern contract, tort, civil procedure, and 
commercial law.14' According to Glendon, "[tlhe decisive element in the 
transformation of the residential landlord-tenant relationship has been its 
subjection to pervasive, mostly statutory, regulation of its  incident^."'^^ 
B. Rejection of the "No-Repair" Rule 
One of the significant doctrinal changes in private lease law was the 
reconceptualization of the lease. Many courts declared that a lease, to 
some extent, is both an estate in land and a contract. This enabled courts 
to ameliorate the seeming harshness of private lease law by applying the 
new "public policy" gloss of contract law.'"" Contract doctrine permitted 
courts to recognize the dependence of covenants and to demand mutual- 
ity of obligation and remedies between landlords and tenants.14' There- 
fore, the tenant could raise the lessor's failure to perform a covenant or 
promise as a basis for withholding the payment of rent while still remain- 
139. Glendon, supra note 25, at 504. 
140. Id. at 505, 575-76. 
141. Id. at 504. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. at 504-05. 
144. See id. at 575-76; see also Humbach, supra note 32, at 1215-17 (contending that an 
application of traditional contract principles to leases may prove to be an obstacle to re- 
form of landlord-tenant law). Humbach notes that courts treat leases and ordinary con- 
tracts differently. Id. at 1215. In fact, reformists may be better served by traditional 
conceptions, rather than ordinary contract law. Id. at 1215, 1288. Humbach argues that 
"[r]esort to a contract theory of leasing can be criticized for its flawed understanding of 
contract law and for its nonrecognition of certain factual realities and interpretational con- 
sequences which would rationalize results under the conveyance approach." Id. at 1288. 
As Humbach explains, the common law courts' choice of the conveyance theory was 
thought to better protect the tenant's possession under the common law system. Id.; see 
Subcommittee on the Model Landlord-Tenant Act of Committee on Leases, Proposed 
Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, 8 REAL PROP., PROB. & TRUST J. 104,105 
(1973) (suggesting that residential lease arrangement should be founded in contract law). 
145. See Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202,208 (Vt. 1984); Pines v. Perssion, 111 N.W.2d 
409, 413 (Wis. 1961); Humbach, supra note 32, at 1215-17. 
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ing in possession.146 The tenant could assert the same defense in a sum- 
mary proceeding brought by the landlord to recover posse~sion.~~' 
Moreover, contract doctrine enabled courts to imply lease termst4* and to 
refuse to enforce terms that were found unc~nsc ionable .~~~ 
Perhaps the most significant implied term is the implied warranty of 
habitability as discussed in Javins v. First National Realty Corp.lS0 In 
Javins, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit rejected the common law no-repair rule and held that, in the con- 
text of an urban residential lease, tenants have the benefit of an implied 
warranty of the landlord to maintain the premises in a state that is fit for 
human habitation."' The court explained that "the common law itself 
must recognize the landlord's obligation to keep his premises in a habita- 
ble ~ondition.""~ The court offered three reasons for its decision. First, 
the court noted that the no-repair rule was based on factual assumptions 
that are not applicable to the modern residential 1 e a ~ e . l ~ ~  The rule arose 
in an agrarian economy where the land itself was the essence of the land- 
lord-tenant relationship, and the tenant farmer was capable of making his 
own repairs.lS4 This stands in marked contrast to the modern, urban 
apartment dweller's lease that has value because it gives the tenant a 
place to live."' Furthermore, given the increased structural complexity 
146. See Berzito v. Gambino, 308 A.2d 17, 21 (N.J. 1973); P.H. Inv. v. Oliver, 818 P.2d 
1018, 1020 (Utah 1991); Hilder, 478 A.2d at 209-10. But see Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 
56 (1972) (holding that a statute that precluded a tenant from raising the landlord's failure 
to maintain the leased premises as a defense in a summary eviction proceeding did not 
violate due process). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, LANDLORD 
AND TENANT 5 7.1 (1977) (discussing the remedies available to a tenant when a landlord 
fails to perform a promise contained in a lease). 
147. See, e.g., Berzito, 308 A.2d at 21-22. 
148. See UNIF. RESIDENTIAL ANDLORD AND TENANT A m  8 1.303, 7B U.L.A. 44 
(1985). 
149. See id. 
150. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). 
151. Id. at 1078-79. In fact, a number of court decisions foreshadowed Javins. In Dela- 
mater v. Foreman, 239 N.W. 148 (Minn. 1931), the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the 
old common law rules had to be adapted to the circumstances of modern apartment build- 
ings. Id. at 148-49. In the modern context, the landlord should be held to an implied 
covenant that guarantees the habitability of the premises. Id. However, a court did not 
make a similar ruling for another 30 years. In Pines v. Perssion, 111 N.W.2d 409 (Wis. 
1961), the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that there was an implied warranty of habitabil- 
ity in a one-year residential lease and that the covenants to pay rent and to provide a 
habitable house were mutually dependent. Id. at 413. 
152. Javins, 428 F.2d at 1077. 
153. Id. at 1074. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. When "city dwellers, both rich and poor, seek 'shelter' today, they seek a well 
known package of goods and services-a package which includes not merely walls and 
ceilings, but also adequate heat, light and ventilation, serviceable plumbing facilities, se- 
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of buildings, it is difficult for the typical tenant to make repairs.156 
Second, the court reasoned that the no-repair rule had to be aban- 
doned in order to bring residential landlord-tenant law into harmony with 
emerging principles in consumer protection and contract law.15' In inter- 
preting most contracts, courts sought to protect the legitimate expecta- 
tions of the buyer by steadily broadening the seller's responsibility for the 
quality of goods and services through implied warranties of q ~ a 1 i t y . l ~ ~  
Based on these same theories, courts began to hold sellers and developers 
of real property responsible for the quality of the residential unit. Thus, a 
tenant may rely on the expectation that his apartment will be habitable 
for the term of.the lease, just as a purchaser of goods or services and a 
consumer renter may rely on the honesty of the supplier's assurance that 
the goods are of merchantable quality.15' 
Third, the Javins court explained that the nature of the modern urban 
housing market dictated the abandonment of the old rule. It noted that 
housing codes regulate certain aspects of the housing market, specifically 
those pertaining to conditions affecting the health and well-being of the 
c~mmuni ty . ' ~~  The court noted that "the social impact of bad housing 
had led to the realization that poor housing is detrimental to the whole 
~ociety."'~' Moreover, it found that housing codes required an implied 
warranty, given their purpose of keeping premises sanitary and safe and 
the socio-political policy of imposing the duty to repair on a property 
owner.16* 
The warranty of habitability requires a landlord to deliver and maintain 
premises in a condition that is fit for human habitation. It applies to de- 
fects existing at the commencement of the lease term as well as those 
arising thereafter.163 The landlord has a continuing duty or covenant to 
cure windows and doors, proper sanitation, and proper maintenance." Id. (footnote 
omitted). 
156. Id. at 1077-78. 
157. Id. at 1078-79. 
158. Id. at 1078-80. 
159. Id. at 1079. 
160. Id. at 1080. 
161. Id. 
162. See id. at 1080; see also Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202, 206-07 (Vt. 1984) (dis- 
cussing the theory of the implied warranty). Prior to Javins, the District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals ruled that renting premises which, at the inception of the lease, fail to 
meet housing code requirements is illegal, making the lease unenforceable. See Brown v. 
Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834, 837 (D.C. 1968). 
163. Later, some courts and statutes extended the warranty to single-family residences 
and to units not subject to a housing or building code. See Glasoe v. Trinkle, 479 N.E.2d 
915, 918 (Ill. 1985); Hilder, 478 A.2d at 202. 
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repair.l6" In most jurisdictions, a tenant does not assume the risk if she 
enters into a lease agreement with knowledge of a defect,16' nor can the 
warranty be waived by the tenant or disclaimed by a landlord through a 
written provision in the lease or an oral agreement.166 In other jurisdic- 
tions, the warranty cannot be waived as to housing code  violation^.'^^ 
Most states have enacted statutes codifying a warranty of habitabil- 
ity.16* These statutes provide a number of remedies to enforce the war- 
ranty, including rescission of the lease agreement, rent withholding, rent 
abatement, right to repair and deduct costs from rent, and injunctive re- 
lief or specific perf~rmance. '~~ Through these statutes, tenants who as- 
sert the warranty are protected from retaliatory action by the landlord, 
164. See Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831 (Mass. 1973); Park West 
Management Corp. v. Mitchell, 391 N.E.2d 1288 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1979); 
Hilder, 478 A.2d at 202. See generally Cunningham, supra note 23, at 59-69 (outlining 
legislation creating a warranty of habitability). 
165. E.g., Hilder, 478 A.2d at 208. 
166. Id.; see, e.g., Moity v. Guillory, 430 So. 2d 1243, 1247 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied 
437 So. 2d 1148 (La. 1983); Boston Hous. Auth., 293 N.E.2d at 831; Fair v. Negley, 390 A.2d 
240,242 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978); Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114,130-31 (W. Va. 1978). The 
New York statute provides that "[alny agreement by a tenant of a dwelling waiving or 
modifying his rights . . . shall be void as contrary to public policy." N.Y. MULT. DWELL. 
LAW 5 302-c(9) (McKinney Supp. 1994). See generally 2 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL 
ON REAL PROPERTY 1 233[2][d] (Patrick J. Rohan ed., 1994) (discussing waiver and dis- 
claimer of the implied warranty of habitability). 
Courts allowing waiver of the warranty of habitability cite the need to protect the expec- 
tations of the parties and their freedom to contract. See, e.g., Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 
791,796-97 (Iowa 1972); Kline v. Burns, 276 A.2d 248,252 (N.H. 1971); Berzito v. Gam- 
bino, 308 A.2d 17, 22 (N.J. 1973); Kamarath v. Bennett, 568 S.W.2d 658, 660 n.2 (Tex. 
1978); Garza-Vale v. Kwiecien, 796 S.W.2d 500, 502-03 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990); P.H. Inv. v. 
Oliver, 818 P.2d 1018, 1021-22 (Utah 1991). Section 2.104(c) of the Uniform Residential 
Landlord Tenant Act seems to support a waiver to the extent that it provides for written 
agreements that shift some of the landlord's statutory duties to the tenant. UNIF. RESIDEN- 
TIAL LANDLORD TENANT A m  5 2.104(~), 7B U.L.A. 260 (1985). In jurisdictions that per- 
mit waivers, courts tend to construe them narrowly and require that they be express and in 
writing. For example, a court may limit waiver coverage to the specific listed defects. See, 
e.g., P.H. Znv., 818 P.2d at 1018. 
167. See, e.g., Boston Hous. Auth., 293 N.E.2d at 831. See generally RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF PROPERTY, LANDLORD AND TENANT $9 5.1-5.6 (1977) (reviewing parties' 
obligations and remedies for unsuitable leased property). The Restatement allows waivers 
unless they are unconscionable or significantly against public policy. A waiver of the war- 
ranty of habitability may be found to be contrary to public policy if it "will materially and 
unreasonably obstruct achievement of a well defined statutory, regulatory, or common law 
policy." Id. 5 5.6 cmt. e. Furthermore, "[tlhe tenant as a matter of law is unable to waive 
any remedies [for breach of the landlord's duty] available to him at the time of entry, if at 
the time of entry it would be unsafe or unhealthy to use the leased premises in the manner 
contemplated by the parties." Id. 5 5.3 cmt. c; see UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND 
TENANT A m  5 1.303,7B U.L.A. 444 (1985). 
168. See SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 113, at $5 12.1 to .13. 
169. Id. 
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such as eviction, increase in rent, change in the lease terms, or 
nonrenewal.170 
Despite the substantial changes in lease law, commentators argue that 
remedies under habitability laws generally fail to improve the welfare of 
indigent tenants, and may even have the negative effect of producing a 
shrinkage of substandard housing."' Others argue that the model codes 
produced by the revolution (for example, the Uniform Residential Land- 
lord-Tenant Act) are "only marginally effective, benefitting primarily 
middle-income tenants in the suburbs or in the cities' better neighbor- 
hoods, while largely failing in the aim of helping the inner-city poor and 
upgrading the quality of slum housing."172 
170. See, e.g., Robinson v. Diamond Hous. Corp., 463 F.2d 853, 857 (D.C. Cir. 1972); 
Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 689 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969). 
Most states have enacted statutory provisions forbidding retaliation. See SCHOSHINSKI, 
supra note 113, $5 12.1 to .13. 
171. See Werner Z. Hirsch, From "Food For Thought" to "Empirical Evidence" About 
Consequences of Landlord-Tenant Laws, 69 CORNELL . REV. 604 (1984). In a national 
study, Hirsch found that only the remedy of receivership significantly affected demand and 
supply regarding low-income tenants. Id. at 606. Statistically, repairldeduct and withhold- 
ing laws had no significant effects. Id. The study also considered habitability laws, as they 
affected two particular classes of indigent tenants-senior citizens and blacks. Id. at 607. 
Receivership laws affect both the rental housing supply and demand functions of indigent 
elderly tenants equally. Id. In the case of indigent black tenants, however, Hirsch found 
that receivership laws affect the supply function much more than the demand function. Id. 
As a result, Hirsch concluded that the habitability laws do not aid indigent black tenants to 
the same extent as they aid indigent elderly tenants. Id. 
Hirsch also studied the effects of habitability laws on the quality of rental housing stock. 
Id. at 608. He found that receivership laws significantly affected the shrinkage of substan- 
dard housing. Id. at 608. A shrinkage of substandardhousing may seem to be a positive 
result, but when the withdrawal or abandonment of substandard housing is not replaced 
with standard, affordable housing, an increase in absolute homelessness results. Hirsch 
concluded that since a strict habitability law, such as receivership, imposed substantial costs 
on landlords, landlords were more likely to abide by its provisions. Id, at 609. Conversely, 
landlords were less likely to honor the less costly and less compelling repair and deduct 
laws. Id. But see Duncan Kennedy, The Effect of the Warranty of Habitability on Low- 
income Housing: "Milking" and Class Violence, 15 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 485 (1987). Ken- 
nedy argued that "enforcement of a nondisclaimable warranty of habitability . . . under 
particular market and institutional circumstances, benefits low-income tenants at the ex- 
pense of their landlords." Id. at 485; see Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Mar- 
kets on Behalf of the Poor Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income 
Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L. J. 1093, 1093-95 (1971) (arguing that housing code en- 
forcement will not benefit the tenants because landlords will simply pass on the costs); 
Richard S. Markovits, The Distributive Impact, Allocative Eficiency, and Overall Desirabil- 
ity of Ideal Housing Codes: Some Theoretical Clarifications, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1815 (1976) 
(arguing that enforcement of ideal housing codes will benefit low-income housing tenants). 
172. Samuel J. Brakel & Donald M. McIntyre, The Uniform Residential Landlord and 
Tenant Act (VRLTA) in Operation: Two Reports, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 555, 559 
(1980). 
While America's housing quality has steadily improved over the past 40 years, 21.6% of 
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Even with the establishment of the warranty of habitability, the con- 
tract theory of leases made no significant adjustment in the bargaining 
positions of the landlord and tenant with regard to the particular terms of 
the lease. Although some limitations were imposed by and rights were 
derived from judicially or statutorily implied terms, particular lease provi- 
sions, such as consideration (the rent and the term of the tenant's posses- 
sion) and conditions and limitations (permissible uses of the property and 
liability for utilities and taxes), remained favorable to the landlord. In 
sum, the typical residential tenant receives a form lease-a standardized 
document offered to all tenants on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, with no ne- 
gotiation over terms.173 
all poor renters (1,417,000 households) in the United States lived in inadequate housing in 
1989. STATE OF HOUSING, supra note 4, at 15. The Joint Center for Housing Studies re- 
ported that although 77.2% of poor renters directed more than half of their household 
incomes towards rents in 1989,1,417,000 poor renter households lived in structurally inade- 
quate housing. Id. at 16. This lack of adequate housing has a greater effect on black and 
Hispanic households because these groups have a higher percentage of poor. Id. at 16-17. 
Housing assistance programs have upgraded housing conditions for many poor households, 
but the~rate of growthin the nation's poor has far~outpaced the rate of subsidy increase. 
Id. at 16. As a result, the number of unassisted poor renters increased from 4.2 million in 
1974 to 5.5 million in 1985. Id. 
Only a small number of public housing projects (approximately six percent) suffer from 
"chronic problems" that would require a per-unit payment of more than $2500 to correct 
violations of basic health and safety standards and to bring the building up to minimum 
property standards. Bratt, supra note 6 at 345; see PROGRAM V, supra note 6, at 306-26 
- ~ 
(reporting that public housing was less likely than private sector housing to have physical 
deficiencies relating to health and safety); MEEHAN, supra note 10, at 135-36,195-96 (criti- 
cizing design and construction flaws, including the inadequate number of large units, poor 
quality of materials, high density and spare quality); Mary J. Huth, An Examination of 
Public Housing in the United States After Forty Years, 8 J .  Soc. & Soc. WELFARE 471,482 
(noting that little publicity is "given to many smaller projects, consisting of highly attractive 
clusters of one- and two- story townhouses and garden apartments surrounded by lawns, 
trees, and playgrounds"). 
173. See Curtis J. Berger, Hard Leases Make Bad Law, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 791, 835 
(1974). Berger studied 16 standard form leases used in major cities throughout the coun- 
try. These leases were typically long (one used in New York City had more than 9000 
words). Berger concluded: 
The leases almost all treat the residential tenant as a latter-day serf. One sees a 
near-pathological concern with tenant duties and landlord remedies, occupying 
from 50 to 80 percent of virtually every form. Much of the remaining text seeks 
to immunize landlord against the claims of his tenant. One looks vainly for any 
recognition of the fact that the tenant may have remedies or the landlord duties. 
~ n d i n l ~  two forms. . . begin to suggest the bilateral contract that defines today's 
landlord-tenant relationship. 
Id.; see Warren Mueller, Residential Tenants and Their Leases: An Empirical Study, 69 
MICH. L. REV. 247 (1970). Mueller's article presents a study of how tenants actually be- 
have with regard to their leases. Mueller reports that about half of the tenants surveyed 
carefully read their leases, although with widely varying degrees of understanding. Id. at 
256. Many tenants regarded conventional provisions, including those favorable to land- 
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C. Persistence of "Termination or Nonrenewal Without Cause" Rule 
The other common law private lease law rule that operates to deny the 
low-income family safe, decent, and affordable housing is the "termina- 
tion or nonrenewal without cause" rule. This rule has been left largely 
intact by the doctrinal changes of the last three decades. This rule, as it 
developed at common law, provides that a property owner is free to re- 
fuse to enter into, or to continue, a landlord-tenant relationship for any 
or no reason. It is not clear why the transition in private lease law failed 
to repudiate this second rule. Perhaps courts and legislatures believed 
that repudiation would threaten fundamental principles of individual 
freedom-to contract and to enjoy private property. A rejection of this 
rule would alter the present form of these freedoms. It is difficult, how- 
ever, to see how the consequences of the intrusion would differ signifi- 
cantly from the effects of the rejection of the no-repair rule. 
The termination or nonrenewal without cause rule would be nullified 
by recognition of a right to continued possession beyond the lease term. 
Such a right could be characterized as an implied contract right or as an 
incident of the property interest in a leasehold. The right to continued 
possession beyond the lease term may be an aspect of a fundamental 
right to housing based in the Constitution. 
1. Constitutional Right to Housing 
Establishing a constitutional right to continued possession of a leased 
premises beyond the stated term may be foreclosed by the Supreme 
Court's ruling in Lindsey v. N ~ r r n e t . ' ~ ~  In Lindsey, the plaintiffs were 
tenants of an apartment declared unfit for habitation due to substandard 
conditions. The plaintiffs requested that the landlord make certain re- 
pairs, but the landlord refused with one minor e~ception."~ The plain- 
tiffs then refused to pay rent and the landlord threatened 
Thereafter, the plaintiffs commenced an action seeking a declaratory 
lords and expressed in fine print, as fair. Id. at 263-64. Few tenants attempted to negotiate 
lease terms; yet those who did enjoyed some success. Id. at 264-65. Mueller notes that 
when the data, which does reveal some bargaining success, is subjected to close 
scrutiny, it is evident that the small number of tenants who secured alteration in 
these terms had only a limited degree of success and are generally persons whose 
occupational skills make them better equipped than the average person for the 
bargaining process. 
Id. at 275. Most likely, these persons also had some choice of tenancies. Cf Steven A. 
Arbittier. Note, The Form 50 Lease: Judicial Treatment of an Adhesion Contract, 111 U .  
PA. L. REV. 1197, 1197 (1963) (discussing the elements of an adhesion lease). 
174. 405 U.S. 56 (1972). 
175. Id. at 58. 
176. Id. at 58-59. 
Heinonline - -  43 Catholic U. L. Rev. 713 1993-1994 
714 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 43:681 
judgment that the state summary possession statute was unconstitutional 
because it denied tenants due process of law.177 The plaintiffs argued that 
certain provisions of the statute, such as those requiring a trial no later 
than six days after service of the complaint unless security for accruing 
rent is deposited with the court, limited the triable issues, precluded con- 
sideration of defenses based on the landlord's breach of a duty to main- 
tain the premises, and violated the Due Process Clause of the 
Const i t~t ion. '~~ 
In rejecting the due process claim, the Supreme Court explained that 
procedural due process required only that there be an opportunity to 
present every available defense.17' The state statute provided such an 
opportunity, but mandated a different forum and a different time for the 
presentation.lsO According to the Court, nothing in the Constitution for- 
bids a state "from treating the undertakings of the tenant and those of the 
landlord as independent rather than dependent c~venants."'~' 
In response to the plaintiffs' assertion that the "need for decent shel- 
ter" and "the right to retain peaceful possession of one's home" should 
be recognized as fundamental interests, the Court stated that it was "un- 
able to perceive . . . any constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of 
a particular quality, or any recognition of the right of a tenant to occupy 
the real property of his landlord beyond the term of his lease . . . contrary 
to the terms of the relevant agreement."ls2 
2. Implied Contract Right to Continued Possession 
Establishing a right to continued possession beyond the lease term and 
abandoning the termination or nonrenewal without cause rule may be the 
next logical step in the "lease as a contract" paradigm. In this paradigm, 
the landlord-tenant relationship is essentially an exchange of goods and 
services, such as the physical premises and running water, for money con- 
- - - - - - 
177. Id. at 59-60. 
178. Id. at 64-67. 
179. Id. at 65-66. 
180. Id. at 66. The Court noted that its prior holdings found it "permissible to segre- 
gate an action for possession of property from other actions arising out of the same factual 
situation that may assert valid legal or equitable defenses or counterclaims." Id. at 67. 
181. Id. at 68. 
182. Id. at 74. Despite Lindsey, there continue to be arguments for constitutional rights 
to such fundamental needs as housing, food, health care, and education. See Frank I. 
Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U .  L.Q. 659; Frank 
I. Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls' Theory of 
Justice, 121 U .  PA. L. REV. 962 (1973); William W. Van Alstyne, The Recrudescence of 
Property Rights as the Foremost Principle of Civil Liberties: The First Decade of the Burger 
Court, LAW & CONTEMP. ROBS., Summer 1980, at 66. 
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sideration (the rent).183 At the center of the paradigm is the implied right 
to the habitable condition of the premises during the stated term, based 
upon the expectations of the parties in the context of modern urban hous- 
ing ~0nd i t i ons . l~~  This model facilitates an equally forceful argument for 
an implied right to possession of housing beyond the stated term. In 
Javins v. First National Realty Corp. ,I8' the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals pointed out that the common law no-repair rule had been super- 
seded because its underlying factual assumptions were no longer ~ a 1 i d . l ~ ~  
The expectations of the landlord and the agrarian tenant at the time that 
the rule was initially developed are different from those of the contempo- 
rary landlord and the urban tenant. In the modern context of urban 
housing shortages, the termination or nonrenewal without cause rule fails 
to reflect the parties' expectations to the same extent as the no-repair 
rule. At common law, the landlord's primary expectations were a market 
rental and acceptable tenant behavior, while the tenant's primary expec- 
tation was undisturbed possession during the term of the lease. In mod- 
ern times, the tenant's expectations also include a habitable premises and 
possession beyond the stated term. While the landlord's expectations do 
not require termination or nonrenewal without cause, both of the modern 
tenant's expectations are defeated by such a rule. 
In Javins, the Supreme Court explained that the social policy underly- 
ing the enactment of modern housing codes required abandonment of the 
no-repair rule because the rule conflicted with the codified legislative pol- 
icy against unsafe and unsanitary dwellings.18' In the same sense, the ter- 
mination or nonrenewal without cause rule conflicts with the equally 
well-defined legislative policy against displacement and homelessness. 
Moreover, the social impact of homelessness resulting from the termina- 
183. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071,1082 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 
400 U.S. 925 (1970). 
184. See Humbach, supra note 32, at 1283-86. Even during the lease term, the contract 
theory has produced the unfortunate situation where a default by the tenant can result in 
the forfeiture of the estate. Under the common law rules, however, a tenant's right of 
possession would nonetheless have to be terminated in accordance with a different and 
more protective set of rules. Humbach explains that "[b]ecause the traditional conception 
views the tenant as having a property right to possession, enforcement of a forfeiture for 
nonpayment means that a property right, in this case the tenant's estate, must be termi- 
nated." Id. at 1284 (footnote omitted). 
185. 428 F.2d at 1071, 
186. Id. at 1076-77. The court held: "In our judgment, the old no-repair rule cannot 
coexist with the obligations imposed on the landlord by a typical modern housing code, 
and must be abandoned in favor of an implied warranty of habitability." Id. (footnotes 
omitted). 
187. Id. at 1077-78. 
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tion or nonrenewal without cause rule is equivalent to the social impact 
of unsafe housing resulting from the no-repair rule. 
The Javins Court further explained that freedom of contract has al- 
ready yielded to greater societal concerns in other contractual situa- 
t i o n ~ . ' ~ ~  Consumer protection and product liability laws, in recognition 
of the unequal bargaining positions between buyer and seller and the 
general societal interest in protecting the health and safety of citizens, 
limit the exclusive right of private parties to determine the terms of their 
bargain.'8y Furthermore, under both state and federal statutes, neither 
sellers nor renters of real property may refuse to sell, lease, or continue a 
landlord-tenant relationship on the basis of the tenant's race, religion, 
national origin, gender, or family composition to the extent that it in- 
cludes ~hildren.''~ Therefore, an additional limitation on the right to 
- 
contract in the interest of preventing homelessness seems consistent with 
these existing restrictions. 
3. An Incident of the Property Interest in a Leasehold 
A right to continued possession beyond the stated lease term is not a 
property interest at common law, but it may be recognized as an incident 
of the property interest in a leasehold. As social and economic conditions 
have changed in the last several decades, the concept of property has un- 
dergone a remarkable transition. As a result, the modern concept of 
property is determined to a greater extent by reference to community 
interests.'" Property is said to involve a bundle of rights inherent in a 
person's relation to others with respect to a physical thing. In the context 
of a leasehold, that bundle includes the right to possess, use, exclude 
188. Id. at 1075 (citing the judicial adoption of implied warranties in the context of 
contracts for the sale of goods). 
189. Id. at 1079. 
190. See Civil Rights Act of 1866,42 U.S.C. # 1982 (1988); Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 
55 3601-3619 (1988); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. ##  12101-12213 
(Supp. 111 1991). In some jurisdictions, discrimination based on sexual orientation is pro- 
hibited. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2515 (1987); Wrs. STAT. ANN. # 101.22 (West Supp. 
1993). These laws, however, may not preclude a landlord from refusing to rent to an un- 
married heterosexual couple. See Baxter v. City of Belleville, 720 F. Supp. 720, 728, 734 
(S.D. 111. 1989) (holding that denying HIV-infected persons a special use permit for a resi- 
dence violated the Fair Housing Act's prohibition against discrimination in the sale or 
rental of housing on basis of the handicap of the buyer). See generally Matthew J. Smith, 
Comment, The Wages of Living in Sin: Discrimination in Housing Against Unmarried 
Couples, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1055 (1992) (reviewing the law's failure to prevent hous- 
ing discrimination against unmarried couples). 
191. See John E. Cribbet, Concepts in Transition: The Search for a New Definition of 
Property, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 1; see also Eric T .  Freyfogle, Context and Accommodation 
in Modern Property Law, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1529,1530 (1989) (noting that property rights 
may come to exist "principally in the form of specific use-rights"). 
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others, enjoy the fruits and profits, destroy, and alienate.19* Although 
these incidents of ownership are necessary for full ownership, as defined 
by the existing legal framework, they are not necessary to constitute own- 
ership per se because ownership can exist in various restricted senses.193 
One might, for example, have the right to the income from a trust, but 
not the right to the ~r incipa1. l~~ Similarly, a person may have the right to 
the income from real property that is leased but not the right to use or 
possess the ~ r 0 p e r t y . l ~ ~  Moreover, each of the property incidents is sub- 
ject to multiple definitions, such that the practical consequences of own- 
ership are altered.196 For example, the right to alienate may be limited by 
rules regarding perpetuities or by prohibitions on racial discrimination. 
The right to use may be limited by the existence of harmful effects pro- 
duced by particular uses,197 or by a legislature's perception of the general 
community interest.198 
Considerations of societal interest influenced the New Jersey Supreme 
Court in an innovative opinion interpreting the right to exclude. In New 
Jersey v. Shack,199 a landowner sought to invoke a state criminal trespass 
statute to exclude staff of various organizations seeking to provide legal 
and medical services to migrant laborers working on his land.200 The 
court held that the unauthorized entry by the staff was beyond the scope 
of the criminal trespass statute because ownership of real property in 
New Jersey does not include the right to bar access to governmental serv- 
ices available to migrant workers.201 The court explained that 
192. A.M. Honore, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107-47 (A.G. 
Guest ed., 1961). Actually, Honore maintains that the liberal conception of property em- 
braces 11 elements. In addition to the rights mentioned, ownership also includes the right 
to security (immunity from expropriation); the absence of term (the indeterminate length 
of ownership); the prohibition of harmful use (the duty to forbear from using the thing in 
certain ways harmful to others); liability to execution (for repayment of a debt); and resid- 
uary character (the existence of rules governing the reversion of lapsed ownership rights). 
Id.; see LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS, PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS 18-19 
(1977) (discussing Honore's account of property rights). 
193. BECKER, supra note 192, at 19 (citing Honore). 
194. Id. 
195. Id. For example, one in bankruptcy might have the right to sell assets, but not the 
right to give assets away. See 11 U.S.C. 5 548(a) (1988). Similarly, a sportsman might have 
the right to give away wild fish or game caught or killed pursuant to his license, but not the 
right to sell it. See, e.g., CAL. FISH & GAME CODE $5 3039, 7121 (West 1984 & Supp. 
1994). 
196. BECKER, supra note 192, at 19. 
197. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394,413-14 (1915) (upholding a munici- 
pal ordinance prohibiting residents from brickmaking). 
198. Zoning laws are the primary source of these limitations. 
199. 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971). 
200. Id. at 370-71. 
201. Id. at 371-72. 
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"[plroperty rights serve human values. They are recognized to that end, 
and are limited by it."202 AS such, a property owner's bundle of rights 
will be confined by the government's interest in preserving the health and 
welfare of its citizens.203 In its opinion, the court found "it unthinkable 
that the farmer-employer can assert a right to isolate the migrant worker 
in any respect significant for the worker's well-being."204 While the 
farmer is entitled to pursue his farming activities without interference, the 
court could see "no legitimate need for a right in the farmer to deny the 
worker the opportunity for aid available from federal, State, or local serv- 
ices, or from recognized charitable groups seeking to assist him."205 
The Shack opinion suggests that the dimensions of "property" are not 
fixed;206 they are defined by societal conditions. The scarcity of land and, 
by implication, the shortage of housing, increases society's stake in this 
resource.207 As the concept of property evolves to respond to current 
societal conditions, few believe that, after Javins, the nonfreehold estate 
is the same as that known at common law. A further redefinition of the 
concept would include, as an incident of the nonfreehold estate, the ten- 
ant's right to continue in possession absent cause to evict. The prevailing 
housing conditions seem to compel such a redefiniti~n.~'~ 
Legislatures in New Jersey and the District of Columbia have taken an 
important redefinitional step. They have altered the common law rules 
pertaining to the tenancy for years and the periodic tenancy as to tenure 
and duration.209 The New Jersey and District of Columbia anti-eviction 
statutes deny a landlord the right to terminate a month-to-month ten- 
ancy, except for good cause as specified by the statute.210 Good cause 
includes failure to pay rent, destruction of the rental property, distur- 
bance of neighbors, and breach of covenants in the lease. It does not, 
202. Id. at 372. 
203. Id. at 373 (quoting 5A RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 5 745, 
at 493-94 (Patrick J. Rohan ed., 1994)). 
204. Id. at 374. 
205. Id. 
206. Property interests are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or 
understandings that are grounded in an independent source, such as state law. See Texaco, 
Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516,525 (1982); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,577 (1972). 
207. See Cribbet, supra, note 191, at 3. 
208. Under such a rule, a landlord would be entitled to increase the rent, although rent 
levels would be constrained by the demand for housing. A proposed rent level that is 
grossly in excess of the prevailing levels on comparable property could be scrutinized as a 
pretext. 
209. D.C. CODE ANN. 8 45-2551 (1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. 5 2A:18-61.1 (West Supp. 
1993). 
210. D.C. CODE ANN. 5 45-2551(a); N.J. STAT. ANN. 9 2A:18-61.1. 
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however, include the landlord's desire to occupy the premises himself.211 
Rent control legislation212 also includes some form of eviction control, 
a variation on the right to continued possession. Qpically, such legisla- 
tion provides tenants in rent controlled buildings a right to renew their 
lease and limits the landlord's eviction right to certain specified grounds. 
These grounds include the resumption of possession for the landlord's 
own occupancy, nonpayment of rent, serious tenant misconduct, removal 
of the property from the housing market, and the failure of the tenant to 
use the unit as a primary residence.'13 
IV. EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC HOUSING LAW 
The public housing tenancy has undergone doctrinal changes in con- 
211. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-2551(b)(i); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.l(a) to (p). 
Under the District of Columbia law, however, an owner of a residential unit who person- 
ally seeks to occupy a unit can evict a tenant on these grounds. D.C. CODE ANN. § 45- 
2551(d). The New Jersey statute was upheld when challenged on constitutional grounds. 
Puttrich v. Smith, 407 A.2d 842 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979); Stamboulos v. McKee, 
342 A.2d 529 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975). See generally Harold N. Hensel, Note, 11 
SETON HALL L. REV. 311 (1980) (discussing the application and interpretation of New 
Jersey's anti-eviction statute by New Jersey courts). 
The New Jersey legislature enacted the eviction statute because: 
At present, there are no limitations imposed by statute upon the reasons a 
landlord may utilize to evict a tenant. As a result, residential tenants frequently 
have been unfairly and arbitrarily ousted from housing quarters in which they 
have been comfortable and where they have not caused any problems. This is a 
serious matter, particularly now that there is a critical shortage of rental housing 
space in New Jersey. This act shall limit the eviction of tenants by landlords to 
reasonable grounds and provide that suitable notice shall be given to tenants 
when an action for eviction is instituted by the landlord. 
Hensel, Note, supra, at 312 n.11 (quoting N.J. Assembly Bill 1586 (1974)); cf. MINN. STAT. 
§§ 566.02 to .17 (1988 & Supp. 1994) (setting forth remedies available to tenants for unlaw- 
ful or forcible entry into tenements). 
212. Rent control legislation began as a post-war, emergency measure to address the 
shortage of available rental housing and the monopolistic effects of such shortages. 
SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 113, 5 7:1, at 502-03. During World War 11, Congress authorized 
the imposition of rent controls in much of the nation as part of its wartime price control 
program. Id. When these federal controls were terminated in the late 1940s. they were 
often replaced by state and local control. Unlike the earlier temporary wartime controls, 
the new ordinances were designed to prevent expected perpetual inflationary rent in- 
creases. See generally id., §§ 7:l-7:10, at 501-30 (providing an overview of the various types 
of rent control legislation); Marc J. Korpus, Note, Rent Control and Landlords' Property 
Rights: The Reasonable Return Doctrine Revived, 33 RUTGER~ L. REV. 165 (1980) (sug- 
gesting that courts should require rents to be set at a level that would not force landlords 
out of the housing market). 
213. See N.Y. UNCONSOL. AW $5 26-501 to -520 (McKinney 1987); see also SCHOSHIN- 
SKI, supra note 113, 7:10, at 528-30. Under typical rent control legislation, a landlord 
must seek the approval of the administering agency before withdrawing a unit from the 
market, even when his repair costs are overwhelming. Id. 
Heinonline - -  43 Catholic U. L. Rev. 719 1993-1994 
720 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 43:681 
junction with the transformations in property, contract, and privacy law. 
These transformations have developed simultaneously with changes in 
the prevailing attitudes toward welfare and other government benefits. 
Contrary to the "revolution" that dismantled aspects of the old private 
lease law regime, the doctrinal changes occurring in public housing law 
have been incremental. Once the movement began, however, the devel- 
opment of the character and dimensions of the public housing tenancy 
exceeded that of the private sector tenancy. Significantly, public housing 
law rejected the termination or nonrenewal without cause rule. Thus, to 
the low-income family, public housing law provides security of tenure, 
some measure of economic stability, and a degree of personal autonomy. 
A. Security of Tenure as a Constitutional Right 
In 1937, the tenancies available to low-income families through public 
housing programs resembled those existing in the private sector. Most 
were month-to-month, periodic tenancies.214 Ironically, a family, which, 
by virtue of its public housing eligibility, was unable to obtain housing on 
the private market and would otherwise be homeless, could be evicted 
from public housing with as little as ten days notice, without explanation 
or cause.215 Some courts reinforced this policy by declaring that there 
was no security of tenure216 or constitutional right to continue living in 
214. See Friedman, supra note 33, at 660. 
215. See Chicago Hous. Auth. v. Stewart, 237 N.E.2d 463, 464-65 (Ill. 1968) (holding 
that, absent a showing that the tenant was being evicted for exercising some constitution- 
ally protected right, neither due process nor the HUD regulations required the housing 
authority to furnish the tenant with the reasons for his eviction, prior to giving him notice 
to vacate), vacated, 393 U.S. 482 (1969); see also Edward J .  Fruchtman, Court Decisions, 7 
J .  Hous. 432 (1950) (citing cases upholding the power of housing authorities to evict ten- 
ants without stating the grounds for eviction); Edward J. Fruchtman, Court Decisions, 6 J .  
Hous. 150 (1949) (same). Until 1968, an applicant for public housing could be turned 
away without explanation. In Holmes v. New York City Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 
1968), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that an applicant 
who is denied public housing is entitled to prompt notice and an opportunity for a hearing. 
Id. at 267. Thereafter, Congress amended the Housing Act in accordance with the Holmes 
decision. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-152,s 214.83 Stat. 
379, 389. 
216. E.g., Walton v. City of Phoenix, 208 P.2d 309 (Ariz. 1949). The court stated: 
It would certainly create an anomalous situation if a person once obtaining pos- 
session had a continuing and indefinite right of tenure. To so construe the statute 
would be to rule that a person after becoming a tenant need not care for the 
premises and need not do anything except in accordance with his own will and 
conscience, thus leaving the plaintiff powerless to perform its functions under the 
Act and in effect negativing the purpose and the expressed intention of the 
legislature. 
Id. at 311. 
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public housing  project^.^" Other courts found it inconceivable that a 
housing authority should be required to provide the tenant with a hearing 
prior to each decision to increase the rent or to terminate a month-to- 
month tenancy?'* For example, a New York court held that "tenants 
[could] not, in a dispossess proceeding, litigate the propriety of the [hous- 
ing] authority's determination that they were undesirable, or had failed to 
pay rent or that there was some other authorized ground for 
terminati~n."~'~ 
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of whether a public hous- 
ing tenant has a vested property right entitling her to procedural safe- 
guards prior to eviction in Thorpe v. Housing In Thorpe, a 
tenant in a federally assisted housing project held a month-to-month 
lease, which allowed the tenant to automatically renew for successive 
one-month terms, provided that she maintained the same income level 
and family composition and that she abided by the terms of the lease.221 
The lease further provided that either the tenant or the housing authority 
could terminate the lease by providing notice at least fifteen days prior to 
the end of any monthly termP2 
One day after the tenant in Thorpe was elected president of a tenants' 
organization, the executive director of the housing authority, providing 
no explanation, notified the tenant that her lease would terminate in fif- 
teen daysP3 The tenant was not informed of the basis for the executive 
director's decision. While the termination proceedings were pending, 
HUD issued a circular requiring that, prior to eviction, the PHA must 
provide a tenant with the specific reasons for the action and an opportu- 
217. See Chicago Hous. Auth., 122 N.E.2d at 524; Municipal Hous. Auth. v. Walck, 97 
N.Y.S.2d 488 (N.Y. App. Div. 1950). 
218. E.g., Smalls v. White Plains Hous. Auth., 230 N.Y.S.2d 106, 109 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1962) (citing Gefland v. New York City Hous. Auth., 111 N.Y.S.2d 256,258 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1952)). 
219. New York City Hous. Auth. v. Greenbaum, 140 N.Y.S.2d 321,321-22 (N.Y. App. 
Term 1955) (finding that the tenants could compel the landlord to prove that an authorized 
ground for termination existed); see New York City Hous. Auth. v. Bernstein, 147 N.Y.S.2d 
262, 262 (N.Y. App. Term 1955) (holding that the propriety of the housing authority's 
determination of tenant ineligibility was reviewable, but was not open to question in a 
summary proceeding); New York City Hous. Auth. v. Russ, 134 N.Y.S.2d 812, 813 (N.Y. 
App. Term 1954) (holding that although tenant was denied a hearing, where the landlord's 
tenant review board reached the decision to terminate the tenancy, the housing authority 
was not required to offer evidence supporting its finding of nondesirability in a summary 
proceeding). 
220. 393 U.S. 268 (1969). 
221. Id. at 270. 
222. Id. 
223. Id. at 271. 
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nity to respond.224 The Supreme Court did not rule on the constitutional 
issue raised by the tenant, but held that the HUD circular was binding on 
the PHA, and that a tenant could not be evicted where the PHA had not 
complied with the circular's requirements.225 
One year after the Thorpe decision, the Supreme Court decided 
Goldberg v. Kelly.226 The Court in Goldberg held that welfare benefits 
are statutory entitlements, and that recipients of these benefits are enti- 
tled to procedural due process before such benefits can be terminated.227 
Three subsequent circuit court opinions addressed the Goldberg issue 
and refined the dimensions of the constitutional rights of public housing 
tenants. 
1. Escalera 
In Escalera v. New York City Housing tenants in a public 
housing project held month-to-month tenancies that allowed for the ter- 
224. Id. at 272. 
225. Id. at 274. In the first Thorpe case, the Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed 
the eviction of the tenant. Housing Auth. v. Thorpe, 148 S.E.2d 290, 292 (N.C. 1966), 
vacated, 386 U.S. 670 (1967). The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated 
the North Carolina Supreme Court judgment, and remanded the case for further determi- 
nation in light of the newly adopted HUD circular containing new procedures for evicting 
tenants. 386 U.S. 670, 673 (1967) [Thorpe I]. These new procedures then became the 
subject of further litigation in Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268 (1969) [Thorpe II]. 
In Thorpe I, Justice Douglas seemed inclined, however, to definitively rule on the constitu- 
tional question, stating that "[i]t is not dispositive to maintain that a private landlord might 
terminate a lease at his pleasure. For this is government we are dealing with, and the 
actions of government are circumscribed by the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amend- 
ment." 386 U.S. at 678 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
226. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
227. Id. at 262-63. Within a year of the Goldberg decision, the Court clearly distin- 
guished entitlements and traditional property rights. Entitlements only exist to the extent 
that the government chooses to offer them. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,479- 
80 (1970). The rights of welfare recipients became more tenuous following the ruling in 
Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971). In Wyman, the Court held that a welfare 
caseworker's visit and search of the recipient's home without consent, without notice, and 
without a warrant did not violate any rights granted by the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 390. 
228. 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970). A thoughtful and perhaps 
ground-breaking state court decision preceded Escalera. Vinson v. Greenburgh Hous. 
Auth., 288 N.Y.S.2d 159 (1968). In Vinson, the housing authority sought to terminate a 
tenant's month-to-month tenancy by giving the required notice, but without stating a rea- 
son. Id. at 161. When the tenant held over, the housing authority brought action. The 
court ruled that the housing authority was not an ordinary landlord, and that "[wlhat may 
be complete freedom of action under private contractual arrangements falls to restricted 
action under public housing leases." Id. at 163 (citations omitted). The court explained 
that the housing authority could not arbitrarily deprive a tenant of his right to continued 
occupancy through the exercise of a contractual provision which terminates the lease. Id. 
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mination of undesirable tenants with one month's notice.229 The housing 
authority's policy provided that if, as a result of a tenant's undesirable 
acts, a project manager recommended termination of the lease, the man- 
ager would arrange a meeting with that tenantF30 At this meeting, the 
project manager would notify the tenant of his proposed recommenda- 
tions, review any information in the tenant's file, and discuss the tenant's 
undesirable activity.231 The tenant was then given an opportunity to ex- 
plain his behavior. If, following the meeting, the project manager again 
recommended termination for nondesirability, the tenant could submit a 
written statement to accompany the project manager's recommendation 
and the tenant's file, which would then be forwarded to the Housing Au- 
thority Tenant Review Board ( T R B ) ? ~ ~  
In this case, the New York City Housing Authority brought proceed- 
ings against one tenant family, alleging that their son committed statutory 
rape, against another tenant because of his arrest on a narcotics charge 
that was not connected to the project, and against various other tenants 
for failure to pay "additional rent."233 Each tenant requested a hear- 
ing;234 one tenant, however, demanded a variety of additional safeguards, 
including advance notice of the charge, a hearing transcript, the right to 
confront and cross-examine witnesses, and an impartial hearing exam- 
Although the TRB panel permitted this tenant's counsel to in- 
229. Escalera, 425 F.2d at 857. A family was considered nondesirable if the behavior of 
any member was considered 
"a detriment to health, safety or morals of its neighbors or the community; an 
adverse influence upon sound family and community life; a source of danger or a 
cause of damage to the property of the Authority; a source of danger to the 
peaceful occupation of other tenants, or a nuisance." 
Id. at 857 n.1 (quoting TENANT REVIEW HANDBOOK, ch. VII, q[ I, App. B, at 4). 
230. Id. at 857. 
231. Id. 
232. Id. If the TRB initially determined that a particular tenant was non-desirable, it 
would notify the tenant in writing that it was " 'considering a recommendation' of termina- 
tion," and that he could appear before the TRB to plead the merits of his case. Id. at 857- 
58. A panel of three persons would conduct a hearing. Id, at 858. Instead of calling wit- 
nesses, the housing authority simply read a summary of the tenant's file. Id. The tenant or 
his representative was allowed to comment or to present and examine relevant witnesses. 
Id. However, the tenant was generally not allowed to review the contents of his file, the 
list of complainants against him, or the summary of the file entries. Id. 
233. Id. at 859. Additional rent charges were assessed against tenants for clogging a 
toilet, permitting undesirable behavior by a relative, playing ball on housing authority 
property, and riding a bicycle on housing authority walkways. Id. at 860. The project man- 
ager had the discretion to determine the amount of additional rent to be charged. Id. If he 
believed an additional charge was warranted, he was authorized to impose such a charge 
after providing the tenant with notice. Id. If the tenant failed to pay the additional 
amount, the landlord could bring an action to collect the unpaid rent. Id. 
234. Id. 
235. Id. 
Heinonline - -  43 Catholic U. L. Rev. 723 1993-1994 
724 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 43:681 
spect his file, it did not grant the other requests, and the tenant refused to 
proceed. Another tenant participated in the hearing even though he was 
not permitted to inspect his file. Subsequently, he was found to be unde- 
sirable, given notice of termination, and ordered to vacate the 
premises.236 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered 
procedural challenges to three different types of action taken by the hous- 
ing authority: (1) termination for nondesirability; (2) termination for vio- 
lation of rules and regulations; and (3) assessment of "additional rent" for 
tenants' nondesirable Addressing the question of whether the 
housing authority procedures denied the tenants-procedural due process, 
the court distinguished the rules and procedures mandated by the HUD 
circular, which were considered when Thorpe came to the Supreme Court 
a second time, from the rules and procedures required by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.238 The court explained that the fact that the tenancy termi- 
nation procedures in Thorpe satisfied the HUD circular requirements did 
not conclusively determine the issue of whether the procedures satisfied 
the Fourteenth Amendment's due process requirements.239 Nor did the 
termination procedures foreclose a constitutional right to continued resi- 
dence in public housing projects.240 According to the court, "[tlhe gov- 
ernment cannot deprive a private citizen of his continued tenancy, 
without affording him adequate procedural safeguards even if public 
housing could be deemed to be a privilege."241 The court explained that 
the nature of the particular government function and the substance of the 
private interest affected will determine the "minimum procedural safe- 
guards required by due process."242 Under these principles, the court 
held that the housing authority procedures for terminating tenancies on 
the ground of nondesirability were deficient.243 
236. Id. 
237. Id. at 857. 
238. Id. at 861. 
239. Id. 
240. Id. 
241. Id. (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970)). 
242. Id. (citing Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 263). 
243. Id. at 862. The court found the housing authority's procedures deficient for four 
reasons. First, the court found the one-sentence summary notice to be inadequate in that it 
did not notify a tenant of the nature of the evidence against him so that he could effectively 
rebut that evidence. Id. Similarly, the court held that the project manager conference was 
insufficient since the manager did not reveal all of the information contained in the file that 
might influence the TRB decision. Id. Second, the provisions denying the tenant access to 
the material in her file, upon which the TRB based its determination, violated due process. 
Id. Such denial rendered the hearing at which the tenant is provided an opportunity to 
rebut evidence against her meaningless because she had no knowledge of the material in 
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The Second Circuit further found that the PHA's procedures for as- 
sessing additional rent charges based on a tenant's nondesirable acts were 
similarly inadequate.244 It determined that the housing authority was un- 
justified in failing to provide procedural safeguards merely because the 
housing authority lease provided for additional rent charges.245 The 
court fashioned a rule favorable to public housing tenants, stating that 
due process requires that a public housing tenant be afforded an adminis- 
trative hearing on any proposed adverse action which could potentially 
result in a deprivation of benefits, even if the tenant had recourse in a 
state The court believed that an entitlement such as public 
housing could not be adequately protected against wrongful deprivation 
in a summary proceeding. The court remarked that "[tlhe cost of defend- 
ing in court and the hazards envisioned by a public housing tenant in 
refusing to pay rent, would probably dissuade all but the boldest tenant 
from contesting an 'additional rent' charge in this manner."247 
2. Caulder 
In Caulder v. Durham Housing the tenant held a lease 
similar to those held by the tenants in Escalera. The lease provided for a 
month-to-month tenancy, which was automatically renewed for the next 
month unless either party gave notice fifteen days prior to the end of the 
month.249 The housing authority advised the tenant that her lease would 
be terminated because of complaints from anonymous  neighbor^.'^' At a 
subsequent hearing, the hearing commissioners denied the tenant's re- 
quest to learn the nature of the specific allegations, the complainants' 
names, and the procedural rules governing the hearing.251 The judge 
her file. Id. Third, the denial of an opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses 
who supplied the information in the tenant's file violated due process because " '[i]n al- 
most every setting where important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process re- 
quires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.' " Id. (quoting 
Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 269). The housing authority rarely advised the tenant as to the 
source of many of the entries in his file. Id. Finally, the court stated that failure to inform 
the tenant of the rules and regulations governing the TRB panel would be improper when 
"[tlhe decision maker's conclusion . . . must rely solely on the legal rules and evidence 
adduced at the hearing." Id. at 863 (quoting Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 271). The court con- 
cluded that if this information is necessary for adequate trial preparation, the information 
must be disclosed prior to the TRB hearing. Id. 
244. Id. at 863-64. 
245. Id. at 864. 
246. Id. at 863-64. 
247. Id. at 864. 
248. 433 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1970), cerr. denied, 401 U.S. 1003 (1971). 
249. Id. at 1000. 
250. Id. 
251. Id. 
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heard the evidence of the complaining witnesses in camera, and the ten- 
ant did not have an opportunity to challenge or cross-examine these wit- 
n e s s e ~ . ~ ~ ~  Consequently, the tenant brought a suit challenging the 
termination of her lease on the theory that she was denied due process of 
law.253 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated that 
the Supreme Court's decision in Goldberg v. Kelly resolved any uncer- 
tainty concerning the application of the Due Process Clause to the rights 
of public housing tenants.254 The court determined that the hearing was 
procedurally flawed, and stated that "[tlhe 'privilege' or the 'right' to oc- 
cupy publicly subsidized low-rent housing seems to us to be no less enti- 
tled to due process protection than entitlement to welfare benefits which 
were the subject of decision in Goldberg or the other rights and privileges 
referred to in G ~ l d b e r g . " ~ ~ ~  The court agreed with the Escalera deci- 
sion256 and ruled that the tenants were entitled to specific procedural 
safeguards, including timely and adequate notice specifically outlining the 
reasons for the proposed termination, the right to cross-examine adverse 
witnesses, the right to representation by counsel, the right to a hearing 
decision based on evidence presented, the right to have the reasons for 
- 
the hearing decision and the evidence relied upon are set forth in writing, 
and the right to a nonpartisan decision-maker."' 
3. Joy 
While Escalera and Caulder are landmark decisions that defined the 
required procedures to be used when public housing tenants faced ad- 
verse action, neither case addressed the question of whether a PHA 
needed a legitimate reason to evict a public housing tenant or to refuse to 
renew a lease at the end of the term. In Escalera, resolution of these 
issues was not necessary because the housing authority's own rules re- 
quired that the tenant be found nonde~irable. '~~ Similarly, in Caulder, 
the court never reached the issue of whether it would require the PHA to 
state a legitimate reason because the housing authority voluntarily of- 
fered reasons for the termination.259 In Joy v. Davies, the United States 
252. Id. 
253. Id. at 1000-01. 
254. Id. at 1002 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)). 
255. Id. at 1003. 
256. 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970); see supra notes 228-47 and 
accompanying text. 
257. Caulder, 433 F.2d at 1003-04. 
258. Escalera, 425 F.2d 857. 
259. Caulder, 433 F.2d at 1000-01. 
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Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit answered the question left un- 
resolved by Escalera and Ca~lder .~~O In Joy, the tenant lived in a quasi- 
public apartment project, constructed and operated with federal subsi- 
dies.261 The tenant's lease provided that "[alt the end of one year, lease is 
automatically renewed from month to month [and] . . . [elither party may 
terminate lease at end of term or any successive term by giving 30 days' 
notice in advance to other party."262 In accordance with these provisions, 
the landlord sought to terminate the tenant's lease at the end of the 
term.263 The district court upheld the termination, finding that the tenant 
"had no right of occupancy upon expiration of the term of the lease."264 
The district court also determined that the tenant was not entitled to pro- 
cedural due process upon termination because she did not have a prop- 
erty right in the lease extending beyond its term.265 
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the court concluded that procedural 
due process only applied when a party was deprived of an interest pro- 
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore it was necessary to 
determine whether the tenant had any such substantive right extending 
beyond the lease term.266 Relying on the specific language of earlier 
Supreme Court decisions articulating the standards for determining 
whether a property right existed, the court stated that "[tlo have a prop- 
erty interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an ab- 
stract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral 
expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement 
to it."267 
For due process purposes, "[a] person's interest in a benefit is a 'prop- 
erty' interest . . . if there are such rules or mutually explicit understand- 
ings that support his claim of entitlement to the benefit."268 To 
determine whether such circumstances existed in Joy, the court looked to 
the applicable statutes, governmental regulations, and the customs and 
understandings of public landlords in the operation of their apartments. 
The court determined that the legislative history of the housing subsidy 
program supported its finding that a property interest may extend beyond 
260. 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973). 
261. Id. at 1237. The tenant was a participant in the Section 221(d)(3) Program of the 
National Housing Act. Id. at 1237-38. This would be considered subsidized housing under 
the typology offered earlier. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text. 
262. Joy, 479 F.2d at 1238. 
263. Id. 
264. Id. at 1239. 
265. See id. 
266. Id. 
267. Id. (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). 
268. Id. at 1240 (quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972)). 
Heinonline - -  43 Catholic U. L. Rev. 727 1993-1994 
728 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 43:681 
the stated term of the lease.269 Congress explicitly declared that " '[tlhe 
national goal . . . [is to provide] a decent home and suitable living envi- 
ronment for every American family.' "270 Moreover, Congress expressed 
its concern that no person be denied participation in public housing on 
the basis of race, color, or national 0rigin.2~' The federal regulations also 
imply a right to be free from arbitrary and discriminatory action, for ex- 
ample, by prohibiting discrimination by a landlord against a family be- 
cause of the presence of children.272 Further, the legislative history 
indicates that a tenant should be allowed to continue occupying a subsi- 
dized apartment even if she becomes ineligible for a government subsidy, 
although she would then be required to pay the full According to 
the Joy court, "[tlhe tenant's expectation of some degree of permanency, 
[was] seemingly shared by Congress, if not by the landlord, [and was] 
bolstered by 'custom,' " whereby eviction was the exception.274 
The Joy court concluded that a tenant in a public housing project has 
"a property right or entitlement to continue occupancy until there exists a 
cause to evict other than the mere expiration of the lease."275 Therefore, 
"the lease provision purporting to give the landlord power to terminate 
without cause at the expiration of a fixed term is invalid."276 The court 
explained that the reasoning in Caulder dictated its holding.277 Proce- 
dural safeguards against deprivation of a property interest would be 
meaningless if they could be circumvented simply by executing a lease 
provision allowing for eviction without cause. The court concluded that 
"[tlo allow a quasi public landlord to evict upon expiration of a fixed term 
is to enable secret and silent discrimination and would wholly emasculate 
. . . C ~ u l d e r . " ~ ~ ~  
Following the Fourth Circuit's decision in Joy, other courts declared 
269. Id. 
270. Id. (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1701t (1988)). Congress also intended to improve the 
"living environment of urban areas" when it enacted the Housing and Urban Development 
Act of 1965. Id. "This [policy] includes adequate, safe, and sanitary quarters. But it also 
implies an atmosphere of stability, security, neighborliness, and social justice.' " Id. (alter- 
ation in original) (quoting McQueen v. Druker, 317 F. Supp. 1122, 1130 (D. Mass. 1970), 
aff'd in part, 438 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1971)). 
271. Id. at 1240-41 (citing 42 U.S.C. 2000a (1988)). 
272. Id. at 1241 (citing 24 C.F.R. 8 221.536 (1971)). 
273. Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 365, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965)). 
274. Id. (footnote omitted). 
275. Id. Therefore, an eviction seeking to deprive a tenant of this expectation consti- 
tutes state action. 
276. Id. 
277. Id. at 1242. 
278. Id.; see Glover v.  Hous. Auth., 444 F.2d 158, 161-62 n.4 (5th Cir. 1971). A public 
housing tenancy may not be terminated in retaliation for tenant complaints to government 
agencies or for engaging in protected speech. See, e.g., McQueen v. Druker, 317 F. Supp. 
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that the same expectation of permanency exists in tenancies under the 
Section 8 Existing Housing ~rogram."~ Similarly, HUD regulations now 
provide that a public housing tenancy may only be terminated for serious 
or repeated violations of the lease or other good cause.280 According to 
these regulations, a public housing tenant must be afforded an opportu- 
nity to express his discontent concerning any dispute arising out of the 
tenancy, except where a PHA seeks termination because the tenant is 
engaged in criminal or drug-related criminal activity.281 
1122,1130-32 (D. Mass. 1970), aff 'd in part, 438 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1971); Holt v. Richmond 
Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 266 F. Supp. 397, 400-01 (E.D. Va. 1966). 
279. Notice, some type of pretermination hearing, and good cause are required to ter- 
minate a tenancy under the Section 8 Existing Housing Programs. See Simmons v. Drew, 
716 F.2d 1160,1164 (7th Cir. 1983); Swann v. Gastonia Hous. Auth., 675 F.2d 1342,1345-47 
(4th Cir. 1982); Ferguson v. Metropolitan Dev. & Hous. Agency, 485 F. Supp. 517,522-24 
(M.D. Tenn. 1980). But see Hill v. Group Three Hous. Dev. Corp., 799 F.2d 385, 390-91 
(8th Cir. 1986) (rejecting the proposition that Section 8 applicants have a property right 
simply because of their status as low-income families); Eidson v. Pierce, 745 F.2d 453,460 
(7th Cir. 1984) (holding that Section 8 benefits applicants have no constitutionally pro- 
tected property interests). See generally Note, Procedural Due Process in Government- 
Subsidized Housing, 86 HARV. L. REV. 880 (1973) (explaining the rights afforded tenants 
in subsidized housing); Martin J. McMahon, Annotation, Tenant Selection Criterion Under 
$ 8  of Housing Act of 1937 (42 U.S.C.S. § 1437fl, 80 A.L.R. FED. 470 (addressing the issue 
of tenant selection under Section 8). 
These constitutional rights function only when an application for housing benefits is 
completed. In this highly regulated area, the application process is complicated and daunt- 
ing for many. Uneducated or unsophisticated applicants may, through ignorance, fail to 
complete the required documents and be denied benefits. However, because the purpose 
of the Housing Act is to aid lower-income families in obtaining a decent place to live, 
substantial compliance with the application requirements may be sufficient. See Brezina v. 
Dowdall, 472 F. Supp. 82,85 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (finding that a plaintiff who failed to complete 
and sign HUD's application for obtaining another certificate of participation for the Sec- 
tion 8 Program was nevertheless entitled to consideration and due process where she 
otherwise notified the PHA that she sought continuation of benefits). 
Public housing tenants may also use a section 1983 civil rights action as an enforcement 
vehicle. See Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423-29 
(1987) (finding that neither the Housing Act nor the Brooke Amendment precluded plain- 
tiffs from bringing suit under section 1983). But see Roberts v. Cameron-Brown Co., 556 
F.2d 356,360-61 (5th Cir. 1977) (finding that a mortgagee did not have a private cause of 
action under the National Housing Act to enforce a contract with HUD); Kingston Square 
Tenants Ass'n v. lhskegee Gardens, Ltd., 792 F. Supp. 1566,1571-73 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (find- 
ing no implied private right of action in the Housing Act or the National Housing Act to 
force HUD and the PHA to repair defects in the physical condition of the premises). 
280. 24 C.F.R. 8 966.4(1)(2)(i) (1993). 
281. 24 C.F.R. 8 966.51(a)(2)(i) (1993); see 24 C.F.R. $966.50-.59 (1993) (detailing the 
requirements to secure a hearing when a tenancy dispute arises); Housing Auth. v. Jackson, 
749 F. Supp. 622,634 (D.N.J. 1990) (holding that due process requires that public housing 
tenants be provided a grievance hearing before eviction). A grievance is defined as "any 
dispute which a tenant may have with respect to PHA action or failure to act in accordance 
with the individual tenant's lease or PHA regulations which adversely affect the individual 
tenant's rights, duties, welfare or status." 24 C.F.R. 5 966.53(a). With the stated excep- 
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In 1982, the Reagan administration proposed an extensive revision of 
all federal regulations governing local PHA respon~ibil i t ies.~~~ In partic- 
ular, the administration proposed to limit the availability of grievance 
procedures to disputes regarding rent calculation and tenant selection.283 
These revisions also sought to eliminate administrative forums provided 
by PHAs in which tenant complaints concerning PHA lease obligations 
were made.284 In response to these proposals, Congress amended the 
Housing Act to require PHAs to establish and maintain administrative 
grievance procedures for the resolution of all tenant disputes concerning 
adverse PHA action.285 
The establishment of proprietary rights for public housing tenants, 
which are now reinforced by the courts and embodied in statutes and 
regulations, suggest that the public housing tenancy, the tenancy in subsi- 
dized housing, and the Section 8 Existing Program tenancy are no longer 
mere month-to-month tenancies, despite contrary language in any lease 
agreement. Consequently, a tenant living in any of these types of housing 
has a right to remain unless she breaches reasonable rules or no longer 
meets the means requirements. More importantly, however, a public 
housing tenant's right to continued possession, to notice of a proposed 
eviction, and to an administrative hearing on such adverse action as out- 
lined in Escalera, Caulder, and Joy, do not depend exclusively on HUD 
regulations. Instead, these rights are based in the Constitution. 
B. Economic Security 
A public housing tenant is required by law to pay no more than thirty 
percent of her income toward rent.286 This ceiling was imposed by the 
tions, these procedures imposed by HUD are mandatory and must be extended to all 
grievances arising between public housing tenants and PHAs. Id. 1 966.51(a)(l). Gener- 
ally, courts have found that administrative grievance procedures, which are calculated to 
improve management-tenant relationships, promote improved housing to the advantage of 
the public housing program. See, e.g., Samuels v. District of Columbia, 770 F.2d 184, 188- 
89 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Brown v. Housing Auth., 471 F.2d 63,65-67 (7th Cir. 1972); Glover v. 
Housing Auth., 444 F.2d 158, 161-62 (5th Cir. 1971); Sims v. Kemp, 781 F. Supp. 1264, 
1267-68 (N.D. Ill. 1991). ' 
282. 47 Fed. Reg. 55,689 (1982). 
283. Id. 
284. 47 Fed. Reg. 55,692 (1982). 
285. House and Urban-Rural Recovery Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-181,s 204,97 Stat. 
1153, 1178 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 1437d(k) (1988)). However in 1990, Con- 
gress passed legislation permitting PHAs to exclude grievances based on drug-related and 
criminal activity. National Affordable Housing Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-625, 104 Stat. 
4079, 4185. 
286. Section 1437a of the Housing Act provides that a lower-income family receiving 
housing assistance shall pay the greater of the following amounts as rent: 
(A) 30 per centum of the family's monthly adjusted income; 
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Brooke Amendment to the Housing which also committed the 
federal government to pay PHAs any additional operating subsidies that 
became necessary as a result of reduced rent collections caused by the 
ceiling.288 When a tenant's rent is under the thirty percent ceiling, how- 
ever, courts have held that no increase can become effective unless the 
tenant is given notice and an opportunity to make written 
 presentation^.^^^ 
(B) 10 per centum of the family's monthly income; or 
(C) if the family is receiving payments for welfare assistance from a public 
agency and a part of such payments, adjusted in accordance with the family's 
actual housing costs, is specifically designated by such agency to meet the family's 
housing costs, the portion of such payments which is so designated. 
42 U.S.C. 8 1437a(a)(l) (1988). 
287. Pub. L. No. 91-152, 8 213(b), 83 Stat. '379, 389 (1969) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
8 1402(1) but subsequently omitted). Originally, the ceiling was 25%. but in 1981 it was 
raised to 30%. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 8 322, 95 
Stat. 357,400 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 8 1437a(a)(l) (1988)). See supra note 286. 
288. The maximum rent charged is understood to cover both shelter and a reasonable 
amount of utilities. Dorsey v. Housing Auth., 984 F.2d 622,625 (4th Cir. 1993). When a 
tenant exceeds the utility allowance, she is surcharged for the amount in excess of the 
allowance. 24 C.F.R. 8 965.477 (1993). The utility allowance is determined by the local 
PHA in accordance with HUD regulations. Id. 89 965.470-40. The regulations require 
the PHA to take into account relevant factors in establishing the allowances, including the 
equipment and function to be covered by the allowance, the energy efficiency of PHA- 
supplied appliances and equipment, climate, dwelling unit size, number of occupants, type 
of construction and project design, the physical condition of the property, and the intended 
temperature levels. Id. 8§ 965.474, 965.476(a)-(d). The regulations further require the 
PHA to maintain an administrative record documenting the basis for the allowances. Id. 
8 965.473(b). These records must be available for tenant inspection. Id. A PHA must give 
notice to all tenants describing the basis for these determinations, including a statement of 
the specific equipment used to calculate the allowances. Id. 8 965.473(c). A PHA must 
also afford all tenants an "opportunity to submit written comments during a period expir- 
ing not less than 30 days prior to the proposed effective date of the Allowances . . . or 
revisions." Id. 
The Supreme Court held that tenants could sue to enforce these provisions. Wright v. 
Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418 (1987). In Wright, the tenants al- 
leged that the housing authority violated HUD regulations by overbilling them for utility 
services to which the tenants were entitled. Id. at 421. ?he tenants claimed they were 
charged for "excess" utility consumption that should have been included in their rent. Id.; 
see Dorsey, 984 F.2d at 629-30 (holding that tenants may sue based on the housing author- 
ity's method of computing allowances, which was not in accordance with HUD's 
regulations). 
289. Compare Burr v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 479 F.2d 1165, 1169 (2d Cir. 
1973) (holding that due process does not require an adversary hearing before a rent in- 
crease but it does require notice) and Thompson v. Washington, 497 F.2d 626,639-41 (D.C. 
Cir. 1973) (holding that tenants have a right to be heard before a local housing authority 
increases the rent) and Marshall v. Lynn, 497 F.2d 643,647 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that 
tenants are entitled under the applicable statute and the constitution to a hearing before a 
rent increase becomes effective), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 970 (1974) with Langevin v. 
Chenango Court, Inc., 447 F.2d 296,300 (2d Cir. 1971) (holding that neither the applicable 
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In the private sector, rent levels, like prices of other commercial goods 
and services, are a product of the economy.290 Jurisdictions having rent 
control legislation, however, are an exception because rent levels are to 
some degree determined by the government.291 Under many rent control 
ordinances, landlords are allowed to impose a uniform maximum periodic 
rent increase-a certain percentage each year as determined by a rent 
control board.292 In setting the increase, the board considers the inflation 
rate or the cost of living index, unusual changes in property taxes, utility 
bills affecting the entire community, and other factors on the demand side 
of the market, such as the unemployment rate.293 
Accordingly, these rent control ordinances and the Housing Act provi- 
sions regarding rent levels expand the property interest in public housing, 
providing the low-income family with a measure of economic security 
through procedural safeguards that must be met before rent levels are 
increased. This expanded property interest places the public housing ten- 
ant in a more favorable position than the private sector tenant in rent- 
controlled housing and in a far better position than the private sector law 
tenant who does not live in rent-controlled housing.294 
statute nor due process mandate that tenants be given a hearing before a proposed rent 
increase becomes effective). 
290. Between 1970 and 1983, the median rent increased at about twice the rate of the 
median income. See Simons, supra note 4, at 269 n.38 (citing HOUSING TASK FORCE, supra 
note 4, at 5). 
291. Rent control ordinances typically identify some "base" rent for each rental unit in 
the controlled area-often the rent being charged on a specific date before the ordinance 
is enacted. When rental units are introduced into the market after the ordinance is in 
effect, the base rent may be agreed to by the landlord and the first tenant. See N.Y. UN- 
CONSOL. LAW 5 8584(1) (McKinney 1987). The Supreme Court ruled that rent control 
legislation does not effect a taking of property for which compensation is required, so long 
as the landowner is assured a fair return on her investment. Pennell v. City of San Jose, 
485 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1988). But see Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 
1062-63 (N.Y.) (holding that rent control constituted a taking because it drastically inter- 
fered with the owners' rights to possess and to exclude others from the property), cert. 
denied, 493 U.S. 976 (1989). 
292. RALPH E. BOYER ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 306 (4th ed. 1991). 
293. See id. Section 5703.28(c) of the San Jose Municipal Ordinance 19,696, provides 
that seven factors be considered: (1) the cost of servicing the landlord's debt (mortgage); 
(2) the rental history of the unit; (3) the principal condition of the unit; (4) changes in the 
amount of landlord-provided services; (5) any additional financial information supplied by 
the landlord; (6) the market value for similar units; and (7) hardship to tenants. San Jose, 
Cal., Ordinance 19,696 (1979), quoted in Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 5 (1987). 
294. In New York City, 46.7% of all rent stabilized households paid 30.3% of their 
income for rent; 32.3% paid more than 40%; and 24.3% paid more than 50%. Stephen 
Dobkin, Confiscating Reality: The Illusion of Controls in the Big Apple, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 
1249, 1249 n.1 (1989). The author derived these statistics from the Bureau of the Census, 
Housing Division in 1987 and reported in the New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey 
77. Id. 
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C. Security Against Involuntary Displacement 
The public housing tenant is afforded security of tenure in several other 
ways. Under applicable regulations, if some casualty renders the original 
housing unit uninhabitable, the tenant is entitled to an alternative unit.295 
If the tenant is forced to relocate because her building is destroyed or 
demolished, she may be entitled to relocation assistance under the Relo- 
cation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition ~ c t . ~ ~ ~  
A public housing tenant's security of tenure is also protected from indi- 
rect termination efforts, such as demolition of the project. A PHA must 
obtain HUD approval before it takes any action to demolish or dispose of 
a public housing project.297 HUD may not approve a PHA application 
for demolition unless the application was developed in consultation with 
tenants in the project.298 Demolition is then permitted only if it is deter- 
mined that the project or portion of the project to be demolished is obso- 
lete as to physical condition, location, or other factors. Thus, the project's 
condition must be unusable and unsalvageable for housing purposes.299 
295. 24 C.F.R. 5 966.4(h) (1993). 
296. Pub. L. No. 91-646, 84 Stat. 1894 (1971) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
58 4601-4655 (1988)). The Act provides relocation assistance to certain displaced persons. 
Section 4601(6)(A) provides two definitions of a "displaced person," one of which is: 
(i) any person who moves from real property, or moves his personal property 
from real property- 
(I) as a direct result of a written notice of intent to acquire or the acquisition of 
such real property in whole or part for a program or project undertaken by a 
Federal agency or with Federal financial assistance . . . . 
42 U.S.C. 5 4601(6)(A)(i)(I). 
Prior to the enactment of this statute, two other legislative provisions offered relocation 
assistance. Amendments to the Federal Housing Act for relocation assistance, Pub. L. No. 
91-609, 5 212, 84 Stat. 1770, 1779 (1970) (repealed 1971), provided relocation assistance 
benefits to persons displaced by urban renewal projects, and the Federal-Aid Highway Act 
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-605, 5 117.84 Stat. 1713, 1724 (codified as amended at 23 U.S.C. 
5 101 et seq.), provided assistance benefits in connection with federally aided highway con- 
struction projects. 
The Supreme Court ruled, however, that these benefits are limited to persons who have 
been displaced " 'for a program or project undertaken by a federal agency.' " Alexander v. 
United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 441 U.S. 39.62-63 (1979) (quoting 42 U.S.C. 
8 4601(6)). Only those persons forced to vacate property due to its acquisition for a fed- 
eral program may receive benefits. See id. at 62; Jones v. United States Dep't of Hous. & 
Urban Dev., 390 F. Supp. 579, 583 (E.D. La. 1974); see also Caramico v. Secretary of 
United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 509 F.2d 694,698 (2d Cir. 1974) (stating that 
"construction programs are the type Congress had in mind in providing displaced person 
assistance"). However, displaced person assistance is not available following HUD's ac- 
quisition of property when a project sponsor defaults on federally insured loans. Alexan- 
der, 441 U.S. at 63-67. 
297. 24 C.F.R. 5 970.4 (1993). 
298. Id. 
299. 42 U.S.C. 5 1437p(a)(l) (1988); 24 C.F.R. 5 970.6. In Cole v. Lynn, 389 F. Supp. 99 
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During the 1980s, some PHAs elected to demolish public housing 
projects rather than undertake necessary repairs.300 Although PHAs 
were required to make an informed decision to demolish, it was not until 
1987 that PHAs and HUD were required to adopt plans to prevent re- 
sulting tenant displacement and homelessness. In 1987, Congress passed 
the Anti-Demolition Act to halt the razing of public housing projects and 
to require construction or acquisition of replacement housing that could 
be expected to last at least fifteen years.301 The Anti-Demolition Act 
also regulates the de facto demolition of public housing projects, which 
occurs when the housing becomes uninhabitable because of the failure to 
maintain and repair, or to restrain d e t e r i ~ r a t i o n . ~ ~ ~  
(D.D.C.), enforced sub nom. Cole v. Hills, 396 F. Supp. 1235 (D.D.C. 1975), HUD sought 
to demolish a housing project as economically infeasible. Id. at 101. The court granted the 
tenants an injunction, which required HUD to discontinue demolition, restore already de- 
molished units to minimally habitable conditions existing as of the date of HUD's decision 
to demolish, and permit former tenants to return on the same terms. Id. at 105-06. The 
court found that HUD failed to consider fully alternatives to demolition and to afford a 
hearing to tenants. Id. at 103; see Marvin Krislov, Note, Ensuring Tenant Consultation 
Before Public Housing is Demolished or Sold, 97 YALE L.J. 1745, 1763 (1988) (stating that 
a litigant challenging HUD decisions must prove an abuse of discretion). But see Resident 
Council v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 980 F.2d 1043,1054 (5th Cir.) (find- 
ing no private right of action to enforce the Frost-Leland Act because the Act was merely 
an appropriations bill), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 75 (1993). 
300. The Frost-Leland Amendment to the 1988 HUD-independent agencies appropria- 
tions bill sought to prohibit HUD "from expending any money for demolition of 2,600 
public housing units" in two congressional districts. 133 CONG. REC. H7741, H7742 (daily 
ed. Sept. 22, 1987). The plan to demolish these projects was condemned as a 
cynical action by the Reagan administration to eliminate one-third of the public 
housing units in Dallas at a time when the problem of the homeless is increasing 
and at a time when there is an increasing number of poor people in the seventh 
largest city of the United States. 
133 CONG. REC. H7745, H7774 (daily ed. Sept 22, 1987). 
301. See Housing and Community Development Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-242, 
0 121, 101 Stat. 1815, 1837-39 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 55 1437p, 
1437p(b)(3)(A)(v). 1437p(b)(3)(B)); H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 426,lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 172 
(1987). reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3317, 3458, 3469. In Project B.A.S.I.C. v. 
O'Rourke, 907 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1990), the PHA and HUD appealed the district court's 
order setting a time schedule for the construction of replacement housing following demo- 
lition of a public housing facility. Id. at 1243. A tenant advocacy organization sought an 
injunction forbidding the housing authority from demolishing several high-rise towers on 
the ground that the proposed demolition violated the federal statute. Id. at 1243-44. The 
PHA and HUD argued that the district court misconstrued the statute in holding that the 
replacement housing requirement applied to a demolition already approved or in progress 
before the Act was amended. Id. at 1244. The United States Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit held that the Frost-Leland Amendment requiring a replacement plan did not 
apply to post-amendment activities of the sort in this case. Id. at 1245; see Walker v. 
United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 912 F.2d 819,829-31 (5th Cir. 1990) (uphold- 
ing Frost-Leland Amendment and Anti-Demolition Act). 
302. See, e.g., Gomez v. Housing Auth., 805 F. Supp. 1363,1375 (W.D. Tex. 1992) (find- 
ing insufficient evidence of de facto demolition); Henry Horner Mothers Guild v. Chicago 
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D. Individual Autonomy and Control 
Prior to the 1960s, a public housing tenant had little personal autonomy 
or control in public housing projects.303 As the nation emerged from the 
Depression, administrators of public housing, the courts, and the former 
public housing tenant-the revived middle class-all seemed to share the 
same hostility against the new class of tenants, the problem poor.304 Pub- 
lic housing tenants were stereotyped as people who had low moral stan- 
dards. Consequently, moral codes were adopted to screen undesirables 
and to reclaim existing tenants. Housing authorities maintained policies 
against illegitimacy, thereby denying admission to or threatening eviction 
of a family if any member had a child out of wedlock. Similarly, housing 
authorities imposed durational requirements for admission eligibility.305 
These policies persisted until the late 1960s when the Supreme Court 
made landmark privacy decisions that declared the right of individuals 
to be free from governmental intrusion in fundamental, private 
matters.306 The logic of this new jurisprudence displaced the aforemen- 
Hous. Auth., 780 F. Supp. 511, 515 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (holding that 5 1437(p) should be 
broadly construed to include both actual and de facto demolition); Tinsley v. Kemp, 750 F. 
Supp. 1001, 1012 (W.D. Mo. 1990) (holding that plaintiffs' claims of 5 1437(p) violations 
can be based on either actual or de facto demolition); Concerned Tenants Ass'n v. Pierce, 
685 F. Supp. 316,319-21 (D. Conn. 1988) (stating that 5 1437(p) applies to either actual or 
de facto demolition). 
303. Charles A. Reich, Beyond the New Property: An Ecological View of Due Process, 
56 BROOK. L. REV. 731, 736 (1990) (arguing that "[c]ontrol is as important as food and 
shelter. Control is necessary to health, critical to self-esteem."). 
304. See Public Housing, supra note 33 at 651-53. 
305. See Thomas v. Housing Auth., 282 F. Supp. 575,579 (E.D. Ark. 1967). In Thomas, 
the plaintiffs complained that they were denied admission to housing because they were 
mothers of illegitimate children. The court stated: 
That evils result from slum living is generally accepted; the wide range of al- 
leged evils need not be detailed here. The theory of the low rent housing pro- 
gram is that if families of low income can be removed from the slums and placed 
in safe, sanitary and decent housing they will be motivated and enabled to lead 
better, healthier and more productive lives. 
Id. 
Although the court found the illegitimacy policy to be invalid because it was inflexible, it 
stated that the housing authority was not required to ignore the fact that families with 
illegitimate children were seeking admission to public housing. Id. at 581. The court sug- 
gested that the housing authority may formulate a policy that gives some consideration to 
the presence of illegitimate children in a family seeking public housing, particularly where 
there were multiple illegitimate children, where they were recently born, and where the 
births had followed each other in rapid succession. Id. For example, if a woman had three 
illegitimate children in three years, the court reasoned that before admitting a woman's 
family to tenancy in one of its facilities, a housing authority may require some assurance 
that the family members would be acceptable tenants, notwithstanding the "past conduct 
of the mother." Id. 
306. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-500 (1977) (addressing 
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tioned housing authority policies.307 Since then, HUD adopted regula- 
tions308 prohibiting PHAs from establishing or implementing tenant 
selection criteria that exclude persons from public housing because they 
are welfare recipients?09 are unwed mothers?1° have a nontraditional 
family composition?" or have not lived as a family for a particular 
duration.312 
Other limitations on tenants' autonomy, however, persisted into the 
1980s. For example, housing authorities adopted rules requiring public 
choices in matters of family living arrangements); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,162- 
66 (1973) (ruling on the right to an abortion in the first trimester of pregnancy); Eisenstadt 
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,453 (1972) (addressing the right to privacy as to matters of procrea- 
tion outside of the marital relationship); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1967) (ad- 
dressing interracial marriage); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) 
(addressing the right to privacy as to matters of procreation within the marital 
relationship). 
307. See Lewis v. Housing Auth., 397 F.2d 178, 181 (5th Cir. 1968) (addressing an ille- 
gitimacy policy); Atkisson v. Kern County Hous. Auth., 130 Cal. Rptr. 375. 379 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1976) (affirming the lower court's determination that local housing authorities may 
not adopt a policy that automatically "den[ied] admission or continued occupancy to a 
particular class, such as unmarried mothers, families having one or more children born out 
of wedlock, families having police records or poor rent-paying habits, etc."). 
308. 24 C.F.R. 5 960.204 (1993). 
309. See Colon v. Tompkins Square Neighbors, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 134, 137 (S.D.N.Y. 
1968) (finding that the housing authority violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Four- 
teenth Amendment by rejecting applicants from a federally funded housing project solely 
on the basis of their status as welfare recipients). 
310. 24 C.F.R. 5 960.204(~)(1). 
311. Id.; see Hann v. Housing Auth., 709 F. Supp. 605,606 (E.D. Pa. 1989). In Hann, 
the unmarried, natural parents of three children applied as a couple for Section 8 benefits, 
but were found to be ineligible because the housing authority did " 'not accept common- 
law relationships.' " Id. (citation omitted). The housing authority's board of commission- 
ers determined "family" to mean " 'two or more persons who will live together in the 
dwelling and are related by blood, marriage or adoption.' " Id. (citation omitted). The 
housing authority stated that the primary reason for this definition was the board of com- 
missioner's belief that cohabitation was "immoral." Id. The court found, however, that 
the housing authority did not have the statutory authority to adopt this regulatory defini- 
tion. Id. at 608-09. The court concluded that the housing authority improperly sought to 
advance its personal moral code, rather than some specific statutory policy or HUD direc- 
tive. Id. at 609-10. 
Moreover, the court found that HUD had previously recognized that unmarried couples 
with children often create a positive family situation. The housing authority's definition of 
family was so restrictive that it excluded those common-law relationships recognized under 
state law as the equivalent of traditional marriages. Id. at 610. Statistics showed that more 
than two million couples lived together in 1986 and that cohabitation was more likely 
among those in the low- to lower- middle-economic classes. Allowing PHAs to exclude 
this group from rental assistance would be unconscionable. Consequently, the court con- 
cluded that Congress could not have intended such a result. Id. 
312. James v. New York City Hous. Auth., 622 F. Supp. 1356,1359-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) 
(holding that mandatory duration-of-family composition requirements violated the Hous- 
ing Act since the regulations did not permit selection criteria on that ground). 
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housing tenants to seek management's approval of overnight guests 
through a registration system. Management claimed that these rules were 
necessary to maintain decent and affordable housing projects. In 1981, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that such 
rules were invalid because they unduly infringed upon tenants' freedom 
of association and intruded on their right of privacy.313 
E. Preferences Based on Hardships 
Public housing tenants are afforded a preference in obtaining public 
housing because they are entitled to assert personal circumstances and 
hardships as factors motivating the decision to create the landlord-tenant 
relationship. Applicants whose families have the greatest need are enti- 
tled to priority for public housing. PHAs are required to give a tenancy 
preference to applicants who are "involuntarily displaced, living in sub- 
standard housing, or paying more than 50 percent of family income for 
rent."314 
Prior to 1990, however, HUD allowed PHAs and private subsidized 
landlords to disregard federal preferences in ten percent of their rental 
units, which enabled them to direct some of the housing assistance to 
higher-income farnilie~.~" In 1990, Congress raised the local preference 
allowance to thirty percent, but provided that the allowance could be 
used only if PHAs and landlords followed the local preference system set 
by a PHA after a public hearing.316 Again in 1992, Congress raised the 
number of units to be rented to local preference holders to fifty per- 
cent.317 Private subsidized landlords, however, did not benefit from this 
increase.318 
313. McKenna v. Peekskill Hous. Auth., 647 F.2d 332,336 (2d Cir. 1981). In McKenna, 
the housing authority required tenants to disclose to the landlord the identities of every 
individual they wished to have as an overnight guest, to have those guests approved under 
a broad reasonableness standard, and to have the guests' identities recorded in their tenant 
files. Id. at 333-34. While the court recognized the legitimate interests of the housing 
authority in maintaining safe, decent housing, and in insuring that only authorized persons 
occupied the units, it found that these requirements were not specifically calculated to 
achieve those ends. Id. at 336. 
314. 24 C.F.R. Q 960.204(b)(4) (1993). These statutory preferences take priority over 
other general admission criteria. See Pruticka v. Posner, 714 F. Supp. 119, 120-21 (D.N.J. 
1989) (acknowledging statutory preferences); Gomez v. Housing Auth., 805 F. Supp. 1363, 
1367 (W.D. Tex. 1992) (same). 
315. See 42 U.S.C. 8 1437d(c)(4)(A) (1988) (amended 1990). 
316. 42 U.S.C. Q 1437d(c)(4)(A)(i) (Supp. I1 1990) (amended 1992). However, HUD 
failed to implement regulations, which prompted Congress to pass legislation directing 
HUD to adopt such regulations within six months. See Pub. L. No. 102-550, Q 104, 106 
Stat. 3672, 3684 (1992). 
317. 42 U.S.C. Q 1437d(c)(4)(A)(i) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). 
318. See id. 
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In addition to priorities for certain preference holders, existing admis- 
sion criteria require PHAs to select tenants in such a way that each pro- 
ject is composed of families who represent a broad range of incomes and 
rent-paying abilities, thus reflecting the range of incomes for lower-in- 
come families in the project area.319 The ultimate objective of the in- 
come-mix provision is to produce housing developments that are not 
occupied exclusively by the very poor, but by a cross-section of lower 
income households, representing a variety of household types.320 How- 
ever, there was debate over the issue of the legality of an income-mix 
objective that passes over applicants with lower incomes in order to select 
higher-income applicants. Housing authorities argued that the income- 
mix formula created a cross-section of occupancy that was an essential 
ingredient in creating economically viable housing as well as a healthy 
social en~ironment .~~ '  The United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit attempted to resolve this controversy in Paris v. United States De- 
partment of Housing & Urban D e ~ e l o p m e n t . ~ ~ ~  In Paris, the court ac- 
cepted the housing authorities' arguments, holding that an income-mix 
policy was consistent with the policies and objectives of Housing 
The Paris decision provoked substantial criticism. Congress responded 
with legislation prohibiting a PHA from adopting or implementing poli- 
cies that passed over very low-income families in favor of higher-income 
or from holding units vacant to await higher-income appli- 
cants when applicants from lower-income ranges are available.325 Even 
under this legislation, however, PHAs can use their local preferences to 
319. 24 C.F.R. $5 960.204(b), 960.205(c) (1993). 
320. Id. 
321. See Fletcher v. Housing Auth., 525 F.2d 532, 534 (6th Cir. 1975). 
322. 843 F.2d 561 (1st Cir. 1988). 
323. Id. at 569. The court rejected the argument that a conference report disapproving 
of the preference for higher-income families indicated a congressional intent to repeal the 
income-mixing provisions. Id. at 568-69. 
324. The Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-550, 
$ 105, 106 Stat. 3672, 3684. 
325. Congress overruled Paris in an amendment to the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless 
Assistance Act Amendments. See Pub. L. No. 100-628, $ 1001, 102 Stat. 3263 (1988) 
(amending 42 U.S.C. $5 1437d(c)(4)(A), 1437n(c) (1981), and codified at 42 U.S.C. 
$ 1437d(c)(4)(A)(i) (Supp. I1 1990)). The 1988 amendment provided that PHAs may not 
by-pass the waiting list for the purpose of assisting higher-income families over lower-in- 
come families. The conference report stated that these amendments were necessary in 
light of the Paris decision. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 1089,lOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 91-92 (1988), 
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4450, 4475-76. The 1988 amendment also was consistent 
with earlier court decisions. See Gholston v. Housing Auth., 818 F.2d 776, 785-86 (11th 
Cir. 1987) (holding that the preference provision was not self-executing and that local au- 
thorities may grant the preference on their own initiative if it complies with the Homeless 
Assistance Act); Tedder v. Housing Auth., 574 F. Supp. 240,247 (W.D. Ky. 1983) (denying 
a motion to dismiss a complaint containing these allegations). 
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select higher-income applicants before applicants on waiting lists with 
lower incomes.326 
F. Control Over Governance and Condition of Premises 
While many of the important public housing lease terms are deter- 
mined by HUD, a public housing tenant retains some control over the 
existence and content of other rules and policies that affect the ten- 
a n ~ y . ~ ~ '  A PHA may not adopt rules and policies governing the tenancy 
unless it has first given notice of the proposed rules and allowed tenants 
to comment.328 Current HUD policy encourages tenant participation in 
the management of the PHA through resident councils, membership on 
PHA governing boards, and resident management corporations.329 
Moreover, the public housing tenant, like the private sector tenant, has 
the right to insist on repairs and maintenance of the premises in a habita- 
ble condition.330 While courts have declined to find an implied warranty 
326. See 24 C.F.R. 5 960.205(~)(8) (1993). 
327. See 24 C.F.R. 5 966.4 (1993) (setting forth public housing lease requirements). 
328. 24 C.F.R. 5 966.5 (1993). 
329. See 24 C.F.R. $5 964.100,964.110,964.120; see, e.g., N.Y. PUB. Hous. LAW 5 30(5) 
(requiring two members of the housing authority's governing body to be tenants). See 
generally Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Final Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. 43,622 (1994) (to be 
codified at 24 C.F.R. $5  905, 913, 964, 990) (improving programs for tenant participation 
and opportunity). 
330. When the issue of habitability in public housing projects was first raised, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected the theory of an implied 
warranty of habitability in public housing leases. Alexander v. United States Dep't of 
Hous. & Urban Dev., 555 F.2d 166, 167 (7th Cir. 1977), aff'd, 441 U.S. 39 (1979). In 
Alexander, tenants sued HUD claiming that they were entitled to relocation benefits under 
the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act because 
their housing project was beyond repair. Id. at 168. They sought to have their security 
deposits returned. The court rejected arguments supporting an implied warranty of habita- 
bility, reasoning that in contrast to housing projects in the private sector, construction and 
operation of public housing effectuates a stated national policy " 'to remedy the unsafe and 
insanitary housing conditions and the acute shortage of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings 
for families of low income.' " Id. at 171 (quoting 42 U.S.C. 5 1401). The court concluded 
that if it implied a warranty of habitability into these leases, it would be insinuating that the 
stated national policy objectives had and were being met. Id. The court believed that such 
a warranty was best left to the legislature. Id. The court further rejected arguments that 
the national policy imposed affirmative obligations upon HUD to maintain suitable dwell- 
ings. concluding that these words only conveyed Congress' lofty objectives. Id. 
Thus, Alexander created an anomaly. While Congress aimed to provide a decent, safe 
living environment through the Housing Act, see 42 U.S.C. 5 1441 (1988), under Alexan- 
der, Congress apparently had imposed no obligation to maintain or to ensure that the 
public housing was, in fact, decent or safe. Not surprisingly, few courts followed Alexander 
to the extent of relieving public housing landlords of all responsibility over the condition of 
the premises. Instead, courts enforced state law warranties of habitability to the extent 
that they were consistent with federal housing law. See Mann v. Pierce, 803 F.2d 1552, 
1556 (11th Cir. 1986); Federal Property Management Corp. v. Harris, 603 F.2d 1226,1229 
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of habitability under the Housing Act, they have adopted state law war- 
ranties as the federal rule of decision governing the condition of federally 
sponsored public housing.331 
Privatization of federal housing assistance would entail a shift from in- 
kind housing benefits to demand-side benefits. For low-income families, 
privatization would also involve a shift in the legal rules governing the 
landlord-tenant relationship from public housing law, with its statutory, 
constitutional, and regulatory protections, to private lease law. The re- 
(6th Cir. 1979); Techer v. Roberts-Harris, 83 F.R.D. 124,128-29 (D. Conn. 1979); Chase v. 
Theodore Mayer Bros., 592 F. Supp. 90, 96 (S.D. Ohio 1983). But see Ramos Perez v. 
United States, 594 F.2d 280,287-88 (1st Cir. 1979) (finding that HUD was under no affirm- 
ative duty to keep tenants safe). See generally Rachel Camber, Note, The Incorporation of 
the Implied Warranty of Habitability in Public Housing Programs, 38 WASH. U. J. URB. & 
CONTEMP. L. 205 (1990) (analyzing courts' incorporation of the implied warranty of habita- 
bility under state law and proposing that Congress should amend the federal housing laws 
to incorporate such a warranty). 
331. In the most recent significant ruling on the issue, the United States Court of Ap- 
peals for the First Circuit rejected Alexander and adopted state law warranties as the fed- 
eral rule of decision in suits seeking the enforcement of the Housing Act. Conille v. 
Secretary of United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 840 F.2d 105,108 (1st Cir. 1988). 
In Conille, the tenant alleged that HUD failed to maintain her apartment in a habitable 
condition and thereby breached an implied warranty of habitability and infringed on her 
right of quiet enjoyment. Id. at 108. The court stated that the general rule requires that 
federal law be applied to a controversy concerning the rights or obligations of the United 
States under a lease, which was entered into in the furtherance of the national housing 
programs. Id. at 109. If the contractual obligations of the United States are not addressed 
by statute, but are resolvable under state law without any conflict with federal policy, then 
state law is said to be " 'incorporated as the federal rule of decision.' " Id. at 110 (quoting 
United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715,728 (1979)). The court found that noth- 
ing in the statute purported to regulate contractual relations in any way between the Secre- 
tary of HUD, as landlord, and his tenants under HUD leases. Id. at 111. Since Congress 
did not comprehensively occupy the field of landlord-tenant law, it had not preempted a 
judicially fashioned federal rule. Id. Therefore, state law, including the warranty of habit- 
ability, would be applied as the federal rule to the extent that it did not conflict with the 
federal statute. Id. at 114. But see Kingston Square Tenants Ass'n v. lhskegee Gardens, 
Ltd., 792 F. Supp. 1566, 1547 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (adopting the reasoning of Alexander). 
While other courts have recognized a federal common law warranty of habitability, they 
limited the remedies available for a breach of the warranty. These remedies usually in- 
clude the equitable enforcement of lease obligations to provide decent, safe, and sanitary 
housing, excluding monetary damages designed to address a prior breach. See Chase, 592 
F. Supp. at 97. 
Public housing tenants also sued housing authorities in actions seeking enforcement of 
local housing, health, and safety codes. See generally Otto J .  Hetzel, The Search for Effec- 
tive and Cost-Efficient Housing Strategies: Enforcing Housing Condition Standards 
Through Code Inspections at Time of Sale or Transfer, 36 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. 
L. 25 (1989) (advocating inspections at the time of sale as a means of enforcement). 
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moval of the government as a party to the landlord-tenant relationship 
would cause this shift in governing legal rules. As a result, the rights and 
protections available to the low-income family would be limited to those 
now available under private lease law. Private lease law does not ade- 
quately address the needs of public housing tenants. It offers few solu- 
tions to their problems. Despite chronic housing shortages, private lease 
law provides no security of tenure, and no control over the cost of hous- 
ing for tenants who do not live in rent-controlled housing. The new rights 
that private lease law does bestow, such as the right to insist on repairs 
during the lease term, may have little practical meaning to the low-in- 
come family. In other words, while private lease law gives the tenant a 
warranty for repairs and contract rights upon which to insist on repairs, 
she may have to resort to litigation in order to enforce these rights. In- 
deed, the tenant may have to settle for money damages or the right to 
quit the premises if the landlord is unwilling or unable to perform his 
lease obligations. While private lease law gives the tenant a remedy 
against invidious discrimination, she is still faced with rejection on 
grounds that may be arbitrary, elitist, unduly strict, or insensitive to her 
particular needs. 
Thus, while the rules governing the landlord-tenant relationship would 
change doctrinally, the only practical difference would be a change in the 
public character of the lessor. The imperatives underlying the protections 
afforded by public housing law, however, would continue. On the practi- 
cal level, those facets of public housing law that provide security of tenure 
and control exist not only because the government is involved, but be- 
cause of the needs of the low-income family.332 Under privatization, the 
harsh and persistent aspects of private lease law as described here could 
operate to exclude low-income families from safe, affordable housing. 
The resulting exacerbation of the housing problem should serve as a 
needed impetus for further reform of private lease law. Unfortunately, 
much of the costs of achieving such reform would fall on those tenants 
originally disadvantaged by the common law, but who are now aided by 
public housing law. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In 1994, more than fifteen percent of the nation's population lives in 
poverty.333 For most of these families and individuals, the American 
332.  ath hews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
333. Robert Pear, Poverty in U.S. Grew Faster than Population Last Year, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 5,1993, at A20. In 1991,14.2% of all Americans and 21.8% of all children lived below 
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dream of home ownership is an elusive concept, an impossible 
Unfortunately, increasing poverty has meant that millions of Americans 
may not even have the option of obtaining a rental unit in the private 
market.335 Public housing programs have attempted to address the hous- 
ing issues confronting low-income families. Through these programs, mil- 
lions of families are provided a decent place to live that would otherwise 
be unavailable on the private rental market. 
Public housing law has evolved to serve human needs, as all law should. 
The public housing tenancy promises security of tenure in safe, decent, 
and affordable housing. Moreover, it enables the individual to control 
some of the circumstances in his life. Public housing programs can cer- 
tainly be criticized on the basis of the quality and the performance of the 
programs. But any failing is not simply a function of public ownership 
and does not justify privatization, given the attendant noneconomic 
the official poverty line. Peter Dreier, America's Urban Crisis: Symptoms, Causes, Solu- 
tions, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1351, 1362-64 (1993). 
334. Most poor people rent housing, spending a larger share of their income on housing 
than other groups. In 1987, one report noted that 63% of poverty-level households were 
renters. See HOUSING TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at 5. According to 1984 census data, the 
median income of public housing tenants was 51% of the homeowner median, decreasing 
from 65% in 1970. Michael Harloe, Private Rental Housing, in HANDBOOK OF HOUSING, 
supra note 4, at 131, 134; see GEORGE STERNLIEB & JAMES W. HUGHES, AMERICA'S 
HOUSING: PROSPEC~S AND PROBLEMS 72 (1980) (reporting similar statistics from 1978 cen- 
sus data). In 1983, more than half of low-income renters spent more than 50% of their 
income on rent. See Simons, supra note 4, at 268 (citing HOUSING TASK FORCE, supra 
note 4, at 6); see also PRIVATIZATION COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 7 (reporting similar 
statistics). 
Most of these renters find themselves trapped in the inner city. David Listoken, A State- 
ment of Appropriate Private and Public Responses to Urban Housing Needs, 36 WASH. U. 
J. URB. & CONTEMP. LAW 63,64 (1989). 'The number of poor persons living in the nation's 
50 largest cities rose by 12% between 1969 and 1979. Id. at 67. During this same period, 
the population in areas where over half of the residents were poor increased by 75%. Id.; 
Harloe, supra, at 132-33 (providing a history of the private rental market and explaining 
how this market emerged as a product of capitalist urbanization). 
335. According to the 1989 American Housing Survey, 4.3 million households received 
public housing assistance or subsidized housing from the federal, state, or local govern- 
ment. STATE OF HOUSING, supra note 4, at 16. Yet in 1991, sources reported 35.7 million 
people living in poverty. See Pear, supra note 333. 
Other characteristics that distinguish renters from homeowners and public housing from 
private sector renters include gender, family composition, and race. One-third of all renter 
households are single-person households, compared with one-sixth of homeowner house- 
holds. Harloe, supra note 334, at 133. While more than 70% of the homeowners were 
members of households consisting of married couples with or without children, only 38% 
of renter households were such. Id. at 134. Additionally, the majority of all female- 
headed households live in rental housing, and one-half of all black- and Hispanic-headed 
households rent. Id. (citing UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS 1984, Tables A-7, A- 
9); see HUGHES & STERNLIEB, supra note 334, at 14-16 (reporting 56.4% of all black fami- 
lies renting compared to 32.3% of white households based on 1976 census data). 
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losses. Instead, any failings are correctable by adequate operating subsi- 
dies to PHAs, additional appropriations for subsidized housing, increased 
tenant involvement in management, and improved design and construc- 
tion quality standards. If such corrections are made, public housing pro- 
grams that include in-kind benefits and provide security of tenure and 
control should be continued and expanded, at least until the anachronistic 
aspects of the common law have been corrected. 
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